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Introduction and Summary
Global warming became a focus of public interest in the early 1970s. Since
then, the concern with this topic has constantly grown and spread from the
industrialized world to emerging and developing countries. This worldwide
spread is understandable, keeping in mind that Stern (2006) predicts a
mean global temperature increase of 2-5°C by 2035 in the absence of counter
measures. Such an increase is associated with climate change, implying
weather extremes, sea level rise and desertification, which may in turn lead
to crop failure and forced migration. The consequence of this will be losses
in economic output and public welfare, making questions on climate change
a topic for economic research. Island states and countries in the southern
hemisphere, which are often emerging and developing countries, can be
expected to face the majority of the disastrous consequences associated
with global warming. This explains their joining in the concern.
While controversial in the past, it is now commonly agreed upon that man-
made CO2-emissions cause the global warming observed today. Acting
upon this threat, the industrialized world started to engage in inter coun-
try negotiations on emission caps. In 1997, these negotiations led to the
Kyoto Protocol. In the Kyoto Protocol, many industrialized countries com-
mitted themselves to emission control.1 Others, mainly the emerging and
developing countries did not agree on any commitment, but ratified the
protocol.
Even though there is no commitment by emerging and developing coun-
tries, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) introduced in Article 12
of the Kyoto Protocol manages to include the developing world in global
abatement efforts. The CDM enables public or private entities from indus-
1These commitments are then passed on to the firms under the jurisdiction of the
respective country and constitute the firms’ abatement obligations.
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trialized countries to set up or invest in abatement projects in the develop-
ing world. All projects that bring about emission reductions compared to
the counterfactual emission level that occurred in the absence of the CDM
are admissible. The reductions associated with a CDM project are then
paid out to the investing entity in the form of Certified Emission Reduc-
tions (CERs). These CERs can be sold on the market for CERs or used to
offset the entities’ domestic abatement obligations.
The CDM makes use of the fact that emission abatement is a global public
good, i.e. the location where the abatement is realized is irrelevant. Thus,
abatement can be carried out wherever it is cheapest. Typically, abatement
is cheapest in emerging and developing countries either because production
costs are smaller or because abatement opportunities, all ready taken on at
home, are still available. Thus, entities from industrialized countries facing
an abatement obligation benefit from the CDM.
Therefore, the mechanism has grown to be the largest Green House Gas
(GHG) offset mechanism worldwide (Kachi et al. 2014) and is expected
to have generated around 3 billion CERs by the end of 2015, since its
introduction in 2001.2
Despite this frequent use, politicians, interest groups and scholars have
raised concerns about the CDM ever since it was introduced in Article 12
of the Kyoto Protocol. The concerns mainly revolve around the environ-
mental integrity of the mechanism. Most prominent in the discussion are
the additionality and the low-hanging fruits problem.
Emission reductions generated under the CDM are supposed to be addi-
tional. Being additional means that the reductions would not have occurred
in the absence of the CDM. To ensure additionality, abating firms have to
state the hypothetical baseline emission that would materialize in the ab-
sence of the mechanism and to specify how and by how much their abate-
ment project reduces these emissions. The host country’s government has
to agree to this and a subcontractor working for the UNFCCC’s executive
board has to verify the emission reduction. Then, CERs are paid out for
every metric tonne of CO2 equivalent reduced. However, despite the ver-
2See the CDM statistics on the web-page of the UNFCCC:
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Public/CDMinsights/index.html.
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ification measures, the baseline emissions remain hypothetical. Therefore,
it might well be that some of the abatement occurring under the CDM is
non-additional. Non-additionality implies that the Kyoto target is diluted.
This happens if CERs from non-additional projects are used to offset the
domestic abatement obligation and domestic emissions can increase for ev-
ery CER. Then, overall emissions increase rather than decrease (see Greiner
and Michaelowa 2003).
The low-hanging fruits problem arises when CDM abatement crowds out
a developing country’s own abatement. When developing countries them-
selves want to commit to abatement obligations in the future, the only
abatement options left are the expensive ones. This coincides poorly with
the mechanism’s goal of supporting clean development. See Rose et al.
(1999) and Narain and van’t Veld (2008) on the low-hanging fruits prob-
lem.
Mainly calling on the concerns mentioned above, some governments dis-
cussed and introduced restrictions on the import of CERs. These restric-
tions can take the form of quantitative limits for CER imports or of dis-
counting CERs compared to domestic emission reductions.
A last note on the relevance of the CDM might be in order. Admittedly,
CER prices have plummeted just like the prices for domestic emission cer-
tificates did, and there are voices that predict the CDM’s fade into irrele-
vance. However, as long as CO2-emissions are worryingly high and global
warming constitutes a problem, an abatement need will remain. With
an abatement need, there will be demand for market mechanisms and for
cheap abatement opportunities. Even if this demand should be met by a
new mechanism or through bilateral agreements, as is currently the case
in Japan (Kachi et al. 2014), the questions I address regarding the CDM,
in particular the welfare effects of cross border abatement and the implica-
tions of restricting abroad abatement with a quantity limit or an allowabil-
ity rate or discount, remain relevant and would be worthwhile to consider
when designing alternative options.
In the three chapters of this thesis, I formally analyze the implications
of the CDM itself and of the import restrictions imposed on CERs. In
Chapter 1, I start with a welfare analysis. Chapters 2 and 3 go into more
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detail and consider the cause and effect of the observed import restrictions
for CERs. In Chapter 2, I consider a monitoring problem as a possible
economic explanation for the observed import quota. In Chapter 3, I look
into the effects of a CER discount on the equilibrium allocation of domestic
and abroad abatement. The following paragraphs provide a more detailed
preview of the three chapters.
Chapter 1 analyzes how the CDM affects the international provision equi-
librium of GHG abatement and the welfare of the industrialized and devel-
oping countries involved. In this chapter, I apply a non-cooperative Nash
game in a public goods provision framework. In this framework, an indus-
trialized and a developing country privately contribute to the global public
good: emission abatement. While both, the industrialized and the devel-
oping country can contribute and are assumed to have a positive valuation
for abatement, I assume that this valuation is larger for the industrialized
than for the developing country.
The results from the public goods game suggest that the CDM, i.e. allowing
the industrialized and the developing country to abate on the developing
country’s soil, increases the welfare of them both. However, whose wel-
fare experiences the larger increase crucially depends on which of the two
countries has access to the least expensive abatement opportunities in the
developing country (i.e. it depends on whether or not the additionality
principle is fulfilled). Not having access to the least expensive abatement
opportunities in the developing country allows each country to commit to
little abatement. Hence, given a choice, each country would choose to allot
this access to the other country.
As mentioned above, the idea behind the CDM was not only to gener-
ate low cost abatement options for industrialized countries, but also to
include the developing countries in worldwide abatement efforts and to
channel investment into abatement from the industrialized to the devel-
oping world. However, the results in Chapter 1 suggest that both goals,
spurring abatement efforts by developing countries and investment flows
from the industrialized world into developing country abatement, might be
difficult to reach at the same time. Which of the two is more likely to be
realized depends, like the size of the welfare effect mentioned above, on who
4
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has access to the least expensive abatement opportunities in the developing
country: the developing country itself or the industrialized country.
In Chapters 2 and 3, I turn to the question of restricting the use of CERs
and analyze the implications of such restrictions. From an economic view
point, it is a priori unclear why the restrictions on CERs should be suitable
measures to deal with the additionality or the low-hanging fruits problem.
At first glance, they simply make the CDM that was intended to be an
efficiency increasing market mechanism less efficient.
Yet there might be an economic explanation for imposing restrictions on
the use of CERs. For the industrialized country’s government, abroad
abatement is less observable than domestic abatement. This generates a
monitoring problem for the government when the CDM is used. Chapter 2
analyzes whether or not the observed discrimination of abroad abatement
by means of a quota can be explained with this monitoring problem re-
garding abroad abatement. I use a classical monitoring framework with
one government and one firm, building on Becker (1968). This classical
model, I extend by a cost minimization problem subject to a minimum
abatement constraint and introduce heterogeneous observability for abate-
ment generated in different regions. Furthermore, I allow the government to
introduce a quantitative limit on the use of abroad abatement certificates.
Chapter 2 finds that the government can implement the first best abate-
ment allocation even under incomplete information regarding abroad abate-
ment. However, it shows that, starting from a scenario without any quota,
welfare increases when a strictly positive quota is introduced, shifting some
abroad abatement home compared to the first best allocation. This shift
reduces the efficiency of the allocation but, at the same time, increases the
firm’s incentive to comply, thereby reducing the monitoring cost.
Whether the government wants to shift all of the abroad abatement home or
wants to allow for some abroad abatement depends on the monitoring cost,
the fine, the abatement obligation and the cost of the last domestic and the
first foreign unit of abatement. The smaller the monitoring cost, the larger
the fine and the abatement obligation, the higher the cost for the last unit
of domestic and the lower the cost for the first unit of abroad abatement,
the more likely is it that the government allows abroad abatement.
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The use of a quota for CERs can, evidently, be justified by the existence
of a monitoring problem regarding abroad abatement. But what about a
discount/an allowability reduction? The literature commonly finds that
quantity and price instruments are equivalent. In this context Weitzman
(1974) considers the effect of emission standards versus pollution taxes
and Pizer (1997) looks into the effect of taxes on emissions versus permits
for emissions. Both claim that for every quantity instrument there is a
price instrument inducing the same results, unless there exists, for example,
uncertainty over costs.
Likewise, in my case, for a discount/an allowability reduction, there is a cor-
responding reduction in the total abatement obligation such that the com-
bined policy (allowability reduction plus reduction in abatement obligation)
leads to an equivalent outcome as a given quota. However, politicians never
considered decreasing the abatement obligation along with the allowability
of abroad abatement. This implies that in the scenario at hand, opposing ef-
fects on the abatement allocation resulting from discount/allowability rate
and quota can not be ruled out. Therefore, Chapter 3 analyzes how an al-
lowability reduction for abroad abatement certificates affects the allocation
equilibrium of domestic and abroad abatement. It further asks whether or
not abroad abatement necessarily decreases following the allowability re-
duction and, if not, under which condition the allowability reduction might
actually increase abroad abatement. Moreover, Chapter 3 studies whether
or not reduced allowability of CERs can address the additionality and the
low-hanging fruits problem. Chapter 3 employs a cost minimization frame-
work with a representative firm facing a minimum abatement constraint.
Comparative statics with respect to the allowability rate show that both
the effect on domestic abatement and the effect on abroad abatement can
be decomposed into a substitution and a quantity effect. While the substi-
tution effect measures the change stemming from the compensated relative
decrease in allowability, the quantity effect measures the change resulting
from the increased need for abatement when previously used CERs are less
allowable.
For domestic abatement, both substitution and quantity effects work to-
wards an increase, such that domestic abatement increases as allowability
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decreases. The effect on abroad abatement, however, is ambiguous. While
the quantity effect again works towards an increase, the substitution ef-
fect points towards a decrease. Which of the two dominates the other,
and therefore the direction of the overall effect, depends on the policy ad-
vantage at home weighted with domestic relative to abroad equilibrium
abatement and the abatement elasticity of marginal domestic abatement
costs. Chapter 3 shows that, under plausible assumptions, abroad abate-
ment can increase following a relative decrease in the allowability of CERs.
The results are robust to the introduction of a secondary market for emis-
sion certificates as long as the price is endogenous, i.e. it reacts to changes
in the allowability of CERs.
As mentioned above, restrictions on CERs are commonly justified with the
additionality problem and the low-hanging fruits issue. Regarding the goal
of weakening the additionality problem, my results are in line with the
policy maker’s intention. Effective emission reductions increase with an
allowability reduction and the CDM moves from pure offsetting to actual
GHG abatement. However, the low-hanging fruits issue might become more
severe as allowability is reduced. I find that abroad abatement does not
necessarily decrease reacting to an allowability reduction, but might also
increase. When crowding out is an issue, it worsens with increasing abroad
abatement.
Furthermore, as foreign abatement does not necessarily decrease follow-
ing an allowability reduction, my results suggest that a quota on abroad
abatement, as employed in Chapter 2, is (weakly) superior to an allowabil-
ity or discount rate when it comes to addressing the monitoring problem
regarding abroad abatement.
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Chapter 1.
Cross Border Abatement and its
Welfare Effects
1.1. Introduction
In international climate policy, the Kyoto Protocol marks a milestone for
the global coordination on fighting Green House Gas (GHG)-induced cli-
mate change. This chapter analyzes a special feature of the Kyoto Protocol,
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).3 After the European Union
Emission Trading System, the CDM is the world’s second largest market
for emission permits, both with respect to usage and issuance of emission
permits.4 The CDM enables industrialized countries to offset Green House
Gas emissions, not only at home but also in developing or emerging coun-
tries, abroad. Emission credits, which industrialized countries earn for their
abatement abroad, can be counted against the countries’ national emission
reduction obligations. This chapter provides a detailed description of the
Clean Development Mechanism and of how it works before it examines how
the CDM affects the international provision equilibrium of GHG abatement
and the welfare of the countries involved.
To model the strategic interaction between an industrialized and a de-
veloping country and to derive the abatement equilibrium, I use a non-
cooperative Nash game in a public goods provision framework. In this
3This chapter is based on Aresin (2013), Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public
Finance Working Paper No. 2013-04.
4See Newell et al. (2013).
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analysis, environmental protection in the form of emission reduction is
seen as a global public good that is privately provided by, both the indus-
trialized and developing/emerging country. Both countries can contribute
to global abatement, and both countries are assumed to value abatement
positively, but the industrialized country assigns a higher value to emission
reduction than does the developing country.
The results from the public good game show that both the industrialized
and the developing country have greater welfare with the CDM than with-
out it. In addition, I find that under the CDM, i.e. for cases in which the
industrialized and the developing countries can each abate on the develop-
ing country’s soil, the equilibrium results strongly depend on which of the
two countries has access to the least expensive abatement opportunities
in the developing country. Given a choice, each country would prefer for
the other to have access to the least expensive abatement opportunities
because this allows them to commit to low emission reductions.
The parties to the Climate Convention, which issued the Kyoto Protocol,
pursue several goals. Amongst these goals is not only worldwide commit-
ment to emission reduction, but also the flow of support from rich, indus-
trialized countries to poor, developing ones. Both these objectives shall be
supported by the Clean Development Mechanism. This chapter suggests
that reaching both goals at the same time might be difficult and whether
the first or the second goal is realized depends entirely on who has access
to the least expensive abatement opportunities in the developing country:
the developing country itself or the industrialized country.
Methodologically, this chapter is closest to the literature on the private
provision of public goods. Major contributions to this literature were made
by Cornes and Sandler (1985) and Bergstrom et al. (1986). Hoel (1991)
applied the Cornes and Sandler model to environmental public goods. He
showed that uncoordinated unilateral action taken to reduce GHG emis-
sions can negatively affect a country’s negotiating position. Further, uni-
lateral action might even lead to more global emissions than self-interested
actions by all countries.
In this chapter the equilibrium outcome of the public good game changes
due to a changed institutional framework. Likewise, Konrad (1994), Buch-
9
Cross Border Abatement and its Welfare Effects
holz and Konrad (1994), Buchholz and Konrad (1995), Ihori (1996) and
Morath (2010) consider institutional change and analyze its implications.
Konrad (1994) introduces a period previous to the public good game, in
which players can determine which fraction of their endowment shall be
disposable income in the public goods game. He finds that this generates
an incentive to strongly reduce disposable income and free-ride on richer
individuals’ contributions in the public good game.
In Buchholz and Konrad (1994), players simultaneously choose their pro-
duction technologies prior to a simultaneous emission reduction game. Play-
ers have the incentive to choose a production technology that leads to high
opportunity costs for abatement and therefore makes free-riding, in the
second stage of the game, credible. Buchholz and Konrad (1995) and Ihori
(1996) look at two-country models, in which the two players have differ-
ent contribution productivities and therefore different contribution costs.
Previous to the public good provision game, players can simultaneously
choose to make an income transfer to the other player. Both papers find
that the less productive agent has an incentive to transfer income to the
more productive one, committing itself to low contributions in the public
good provision game.
In Morath (2010) the players do not know the value of emission reduction.
They can, however, publicly acquire information on the abatement value
previous to a public good game of abatement. Morath finds that players can
have an incentive to abstain from information acquisition. The reason being
that information acquisition, which positively affects own contributions,
can in return decrease other countries’ contributions if the own benefits
from abatement are publicly learned to be large. This strategic information
acquisition can have a negative effect on GHG abatement and efficiency.
All authors mentioned above deal with voluntary public good provision and
most of them look at an environmental public good. They do, however,
only consider domestic abatement and do not address public good contri-
butions that a player carries out abroad, which is the case for the Clean
Development Mechanism. In this chapter, in contrast, I abstract from the
strategic interaction that occurs between countries that contribute to the
global public good, emission reduction, by abating domestically and fo-
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cus on the strategic interaction that occurs when a country abates abroad
(i.e. when a country contributes to the public good, emission reduction, by
abating in another country).
As I do in this chapter, Bréchet et al. (2012) analyze the Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism, though not in a public good game. They use a bargaining
model to study the implications of the CDM on global emissions. Firms
from an industrialized and a developing country join together for a CDM
project. They bargain over each other’s optimal investment level in clean
technology, their carbon emission level and their respective shares of emis-
sion credits which they receive from the CDM project. The authors find
that, when the firm from the developing country has a positive bargaining
power, the CDM leads to an emission increase. Furthermore, the authors
examine the effect of adding a new country that does not commit to any
abatement target to the Kyoto Protocol. They find that global emission
reductions only occur if this new developing country has no bargaining
power. In contrast to Bréchet et al. (2012), my focus is not on the interac-
tion of firms that jointly engage in an abatement project nor on the effect
the CDM has on global emissions. I concentrate on both the strategic
interaction between two GHG abating countries when, under the CDM,
firms of the industrialized country can engage in abatement projects in
the developing country, and on the welfare implications of this strategic
interaction.
Other literature on the CDM deals predominantly with optimizing the
Clean Development Mechanism. A recurring concern is to preserve the
environmental integrity of the mechanism. The authors of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol intended for CDM projects to be additional to low-cost abatement
projects, which are cost-efficient on their own and do not require the pay-
ment of emission credits, in the form of Certified Emission Reductions
(CERs), to become economical.5Many authors claim that this additional-
ity is not warranted for a large proportion of CDM projects. Extra emission
credits, which are paid out for abatement that is not truly additional but
5The literature distinguishes between additionality of emissions and financial addition-
ality. The first measures whether or not emissions will be reduced compared to the
counterfactual, the latter whether or not the CDM project would occur if not for
the profits from CER sales. Both should be fulfilled to secure the integrity of the
mechanism, see Paulsson (2009).
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would have also occurred in the absence of the CDM, might be created
as the host countries do not have an emission restriction. Therefore, the
CDM might lead to an increase in Green House Gas emissions instead of
an emission reduction due to the mechanism. Intending to provide a solu-
tion to this problem, a number of authors assess new ways to measure the
counterfactual to which the abatement under the CDM shall add (Paulsson
2009). With this chapter, I do not attempt to solve the additionality prob-
lem, but take the fact that not all CDM projects are additional as given
and focus on how additional versus non-additional CDM abatement affects
the strategic interaction between industrialized and developing countries.
The aspect of additionality enters my framework via the question of who
has access to the least expensive abatement opportunities in the develop-
ing country: the developing country itself (additional) or the industrialized
country (non-additional).
The following section provides a broad illustration of the Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism. Section 3 deals with the formal analysis of the CDM. It
starts with a benchmark case and then considers two cases with the CDM
under different cost regimes. Section 4 compares the model results in the
different cases under normative aspects. Section 5 concludes the chapter.
1.2. The Institution CDM
The description of the Clean Development Mechanism can be found in Ar-
ticle 12 of the Kyoto Protocol.6 This article makes clear that the CDM is
intended to allow industrialized (Annex I) countries to reach their abate-
ment obligations at the lowest possible cost, and developing or emerging
(Non-Annex I) countries to profit from foreign investment and technology
spill-overs. Annex I countries to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change from 1992 (UNFCCC) are for the most part developed
countries and to a lesser extent additional countries who likewise committed
themselves to reducing their GHG emissions.7 When the Annex I coun-
6Article 12 is provided in Appendix A.
7Annex I countries are all OECD countries in the year 2013 less Chile, Israel, Korea
and Mexico and plus Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Monaco, Romania, Russian Federation and Ukraine.
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tries committed themselves to emission reductions in 1992, their intention
was to return to 1990-emission levels by the year 2000 (UNFCCC 1992).
The UNFCCC stipulates no emission reductions for Non-Annex I countries.
These countries are all the countries which have ratified the Kyoto Protocol
but have not agreed to a GHG emission reduction target (see Appendix A,
“Modalities and Procedures for a Clean Development Mechanism”.).8
With the CDM, Annex I countries, self-committed to a GHG emission cap,
can take on abatement projects in Non-Annex I countries whose emissions
are unbounded. Public or private entities from an Annex I country can
initiate and/or invest in GHG abatement projects abroad. For each metric
tonne of CO2 equivalent induced by the investments, the investing entity
gains one so called Certified Emission Reduction (CER).9 These CERs are
emission rights which the investor can sell or use to count against its own
commitment (Paulsson 2009).
Ordinary production plants as well as hydro power stations or photovoltaic
parks can qualify as CDM projects. Generally, any project is admissible
as long as it generates an emission reduction compared to the respective
business-as-usual scenario. The counterfactual business-as-usual scenario
is what would happen in the absence of the CDM, either due to actions
taken by entities from the developing country itself, actions taken by foreign
investors or actions taken by both of the above working together.10 These
three are also the constellations in which CDM projects can be carried out.
In a business-as-usual scenario, an ordinary production plant could make
use of antiquated and high-emission technology. In case of hydro power
or photovoltaic stations, the business-as-usual scenario could be electricity
generation by way of a coal power station. The counterfactual emissions
8Non-Annex I countries are predominantly developing and emerging countries. For
a detailed list, see the web page of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change.
9See Appendix A, “Modalities and Procedures for a Clean Development Mechanism”.
Relevant passages are highlighted
10The entity which proposes the CDM project - either a developing or an industrial-
ized country entity - has to state the amount of counterfactual GHG emissions and
an explanation of how it calculated this number in the Project Design Document.
This document is then reviewed by a Designated Operational Entity, for example
a German TÜV, and submitted to the CDM executive board that is in charge of
overseeing the CDM.
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in the business-as-usual scenario mark the baseline to which emissions of
CDM projects are compared. The units mitigated compared to the baseline
give the number of Certified Emission Reductions which are granted to the
parties involved in the project (Greiner and Michaelowa 2003).
For illustration purposes, the CDM shall be explained by a real life example.
The German RWE AG, one of Europe’s largest electric utilities companies,
frequently uses the CDM to abate in China. One of its abatement projects
is the “Coke Dry Quenching Waste Heat Recovery for Power Generation”
project in the Chinese city of Laiwu. In May 2004 a Chinese firm, Laiwu
Iron & Steel Group Corp., decided to build a power generation plant with
turbines that run on steam, heated by hot inert gas.11 However, the inter-
nal rate of return for the project was viewed as too low, so Laiwu Iron &
Steel decided to register their undertaking as a CDM project. At first, the
Chinese company had to find an Annex I entity willing to abate in China,
which would invest in the project and receive the CERs the project gener-
ated in return. They found RWE AG. To participate in the CDM project,
both companies had to get authorization from their respective government
bodies: the German Federal Environmental Agency’s Emission Trading
Authority in Germany and, in China, the National Development and Re-
form Commission of the Peoples Republic of China. With the application,
Laiwu Iron & Steel submitted a comprehensive Project Design Document
explaining the planned activity and stating a detailed operating plan and
the expected emission reduction compared to the business-as-usual sce-
nario. The document describes in great detail how the business-as-usual
scenario comes about and why the emission reduction by the project is
truly additional to the counterfactual one. The CDM executive board is
the UNFCCC’s entity in charge of all CDM projects. For monitoring pur-
poses, however, the executive board hires private contractors: the so called
Designated Operational Entities. One Designated Operational Entity re-
vises the project, based on its Project Design Document, and recommends
the approval to the CDM executive board. This was TÜV NORD CERT
GmbH in the example. A different Designated Operational Entity oversees
11The hot inert gas is a byproduct of the coke dry quenching. Cold inert gas enters the
dry quenching oven but is not consumed. The hot inert gas then exits the oven, heats
a boiler for the steam production, cools down and again enters the dry quenching
oven.
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the project, visits the project site and validates the actual emission reduc-
tions. In the example, this Designated Operational Entity was TÜV SÜD
Industrie Service GmbH. Therefore, TÜV SÜD is also the entity which cer-
tifies the emission reductions that are generated. The project is expected
to generate emission reductions of 326.309 metric tons of carbon dioxide
equivalent per annum (CDM Project no. 1656: Coke Dry Quenching Waste
Heat Recovery for Power Generation Project of Laiwu Iron & Steel Group
Corp.).
The majority of CDM projects are similar to this example. An entity from
a developing country wants to carry out a CDM project and finds itself
an industrialized partner that invests money and receives Certified Emis-
sion Reductions. However, other projects exist in which the industrialized
partner invests not only money but also know-how.
The intention of the Kyoto authors was that only additional abatement,
which adds to the counterfactual, should occur as CDM abatement, where
Annex I countries invest and receive CERs in return. That is, only high
cost abatement projects should be registered with the UNFCCC. However,
empirical evidence suggests that the additionality principle is often violated
and that CDM projects are often low cost projects.12 Therefore, I will not
only consider the intended case, where CDM projects are the high cost
projects, but also the reversed case, where CDM projects are the low cost
projects.
In the following, projects carried out by the industrialized country in the
developing country are CDM projects where the industrialized country in-
vests money and/or technology in projects abroad and receives CERs in
return. Projects carried out by the developing country itself are projects
that are efficient on their own, without the payment of CERs, but also lead
to emission reductions. That is, the former should be high cost projects,
while the latter should be low cost projects. When the industrialized coun-
try takes on low cost projects that are efficient without the payment of
CERs as CDM projects and receives CERs for them, then the additional-
ity principle is violated.
12See for example Haya (2009). She surveys the general use of the CDM in India and
specific abatement projects in India and China and finds that the majority of the
examined CDM projects are not additional.
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1.3. Formal Analysis
Consider a game with two players, countries H and F . H is an indus-
trialized (Annex I) country and F a developing (Non-Annex I) country.13
Each of the two players, H and F , simultaneously chooses its amount of
emission reduction. For simplicity, I assume that country H can abate in
both H and F while country F can only abate in F .14 Player H ′s set of
possible actions is to choose xHH ∈ [0,∞) and xHF ∈ [0,∞). The variable
xHH denotes the amount of emission reduction country H realizes at home,
and xHF denotes the emission reduction country H realizes in country F .
Player F ′s set of possible actions is to choose xFF ∈ [0,∞), the amount
of emission reduction country F realizes at home. This model explains all
types of CDM projects mentioned in Section 2. It is applicable to projects
where money is transferred from the industrialized to the developing coun-
try to finance abatement there, as well as to projects where physical labor
and/or know-how is transferred from the industrialized to the developing
country for abatement purposes.
Emission reductions by countries H and F are contributions to a global
public good. The payoff function from these public good contributions is
the welfare function of country H for player H and the welfare function of
country F for player F . Player H ′s payoff is
WH = vH (xHH + xHF + xFF )− cH (xHH , xHF , xFF ) ,
and player F ′s payoff is
WF = vF (xHH + xHF + xFF )− cF (xHF , xFF ) .
The parameters vH and vF are player H ′s and F ′s respective marginal
willingnesses to pay for abatement. I assume that the players’ marginal
13Strictly speaking, firms are the ones making the abatement decisions. However, the
countries determine the amount of emission allowances the firms receive and firms
can trade these allowances. So, in the end, the amount of abatement is determined by
the emission quotas set by the Annex I countries and the market mechanism. Here,
for simplicity and as is common in the literature (see for example Hoel (1991)), I let
the countries make the abatement decision.
14F ′s not abating in H reproduces the Clean Development Mechanism and would also
be the equilibrium outcome of a model in which F can abate in H.
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willingnesses to pay for abatement are constant and that both countries
H and F attribute a positive value to GHG reduction, but country H
has a higher marginal willingness to pay for abatement than country F ,
vH > vF > 0.15 Further, I do not model Certified Emission Reductions
(CERs) explicitly, because they do not change the game. They are captured
in H ′s marginal willingness to pay for abatement, vH . I assume complete
information.
The players have to exert abatement costs for each unit of emission re-
duction. The higher the amount of abatement that was already carried
out in a country, the higher are the abatement costs for one additional
unit of abatement in that country. That is, the abatement cost function
in country H must be increasing and convex in xHH , and the abatement
cost function in F must be increasing and convex in xHF and xFF . For
simplicity, I assume quadratic cost functions for the two countries and that
these functions are symmetric. For convex costs, one can think of a vari-
ety of abatement projects ordered by abatement efficiency. That is, when
little abatement has occurred so far, the efficient projects are still available
for implementation. Large amounts of GHG reduction can be carried out
at low costs. The more abatement has already occurred, the smaller the
efficiency of the abatement projects that are still available. That is, high
costs have to be paid for little amounts of GHG reduction.
In the absence of the Clean Development Mechanism, cross border abate-
ment does not occur. That is, xHF = 0. I assume abatement costs in
country H, then, to be a quadratic function of xHH and abatement costs
in country F to be a quadratic function of xFF .
With the CDM, however, both countries can abate in F , while only H is
able to abate in H. That is, xHF ∈ [0,∞). Furthermore, the cost functions
that the countries face in F then depend on which of the two has access
to the least expensive abatement opportunities. In the following, having
access to the least expensive abatement opportunities will be called having
15I deliberately use constant marginal benefits of abatement to abstain from modeling
the strategic effects of country H ′s and country F ′s global abatement decisions,
which of course exist when two parties contribute to the same global public good,
and to focus on the strategic interaction that takes place under the CDM between
countries H and F in country F .
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a preferential right for abatement in F , see Figure 1.1.
In the countries’ cost functions, the parameter γ ∈ {0, 1} indicates who
holds the preferential right. If country H has the preferential right, γ = 0,
if country F has it, γ = 1.16
Figure 1.1.: Cost function in country F with CDM
The general cost function for player H is
cH (xHH , xHF , xFF ) = x2HH + (xHF + γxFF )
2 − γ2x2FF . (1.1)
That is, player H ′s abatement costs are quadratic in H ′s domestic abate-
ment xHH and in H ′s abatement abroad xHF but increase linearly in coun-
try F ′s abatement xFF . This implies that, with every additional unit of
abatement by F , country H ′s marginal costs for abatement in F increase.
Player F ′s cost function is
cF (xFF , xHF ) = (xFF + (1− γ)xHF )2 − (1− γ)2 x2HF . (1.2)
Player F ′s abatement costs are quadratic in its own abatement xFF and
linearly increasing in country H ′s abatement in F , xHF . That is, with every
additional unit of abatement by H in F , country F ′s marginal abatement
costs increase.
16Abatement by countries H and F in F are substitutes. To illustrate this with an
example, one can think of solar panels, being installed on house tops. Once every
roof is filled with solar panels, this technology is exhausted.
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In the following, I derive the Nash equilibrium outcomes for three differ-
ent cases and compare these outcomes to each other. I start with the
Benchmark Case without CDM, where both countries can only abate do-
mestically. The other two cases are with CDM. In one of these cases, F
has a preferential right with regards to emission abatement in country F
(γ = 1). In the other one, H enjoys a preferential right for its abatement
in F (γ = 0).17
With the two CDM cases, I look at borderline cases. There also exists a
variety of cases in between the two with all sorts of alignments of country
H ′s and country F ′s respective abatement projects on the cost function in
F .
1.3.1. Benchmark Case without CDM
Suppose both countries H and F can only abate at home; that is, xHF = 0.
In that case, player H ′s objective function reduces to
max
xHH
WH = vH (xHH + xFF )− x2HH ,
and player F ′s to
max
xF F
WF = vF (xHH + xFF )− x2FF .
It follows directly that optimal contributions are
x∗HH =
vH
2 and x
∗
FF =
vF
2 .
Due to the constant marginal benefit of abatement, optimal abatement
choices do not depend on the other country’s abatement level. The resulting
17When H has the preferential right, additionality of CDM projects is violated. When
F has the preferential right, additionality of CDM projects is warranted. The cases
where one or the other player has a preferential right are not to be mistaken for
cases with sequential moves. The contribution of the other country is unknown when
countries decide on their own contribution. The preferential right is not a right to
move first, but one which ensures a country to have lower marginal abatement costs
in F than the other country. The first mover in the sequential case would, to the
contrary, not use its first mover advantage to secure the relatively lower marginal
abatement costs for itself.
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payoffs are
W ∗H =
v2H
4 +
vHvF
2 (1.3)
and
W ∗F =
v2F
4 +
vHvF
2 . (1.4)
Both players contribute to the public good and both abate up to the
point where the marginal costs of abatement match the respective player’s
marginal willingness to pay, vH and vF . While the players’ abatement
costs are symmetric, player H ′s optimal amount of abatement is larger
than player F ′s as, by assumption, H has a higher marginal benefit from
GHG reduction than F does.
1.3.2. Effect of the Clean Development Mechanism
In the following, I consider the optimal abatement choices if the Clean
Development Mechanism is implemented and cross border abatement is
possible for player H. Therefore, player H faces abatement opportunities
in countries H and F , while player F still only abates in F . That is,
xHF ∈ [0,∞).
1.3.2.1. Preferential right for country F
Suppose country F enjoys a preferential right with respect to emission
reduction. Intuitively, this means that F is allowed to invest in the least
expensive abatement opportunities in F , while H is only allowed to abate
in excess of player F ′s abatement. This is the scenario which corresponds
to the one intended by the Kyoto authors. Abatement under the CDM is
additional in this case.
In the case where F has a preferential right, the assumptions on the cost
functions are such that player H has higher marginal costs than player
F when abating in country F . That is, γ = 1. So player H ′s and F ′s
objective functions are
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WH = vH (xHH + xHF + xFF )− x2HH − (xHF + xFF )
2 + x2FF
and
WF = vF (xHH + xHF + xFF )− x2FF .
From the first order conditions for H, vH = 2xHH and vH = 2(xHF +xFF ),
and for F , vF = 2xFF , the following equilibrium contributions are derived:
x∗HH =
vH
2 , x
∗
HF =
vH − vF
2 and x
∗
FF =
vF
2 .
These abatement choices constitute a unique Nash equilibrium. The equi-
librium welfare for players H and F is,
W ∗H =
v2H
2 +
v2F
4 (1.5)
and
W ∗F = vHvF −
v2F
4 . (1.6)
respectively.
Player F exerts the same amount of abatement as in the Benchmark Case.
In country H, player H still simply chooses the amount of abatement
that maximizes H ′s welfare under isolation. In addition, player H adds
to F ′s abatement projects, in country F , up to the point where its own
marginal willingness to pay equals the marginal abatement costs in coun-
try F . Therefore it is player H ′s additional abatement that leads to larger
global contributions than in the Benchmark Case. The same holds for
global welfare.
1.3.2.2. Preferential right for country H
Suppose country H enjoys a preferential right with respect to emission
reduction. Intuitively, this means that H is allowed to invest in the least
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expensive abatement opportunities in F , while F can only abate in excess of
playerH ′s abatement in F . This is the scenario the Kyoto authors intended
to prevent but which is nonetheless observed empirically. Abatement under
the CDM is non-additional in this case.
In the case where H has a preferential right, the assumptions on the cost
functions are such that player F has higher marginal costs than player
H when abating in country F . That is, γ = 0. So player H ′s and F ′s
objective functions are
WH = vH (xHH + xHF + xFF )− x2HH − x2HF
and
WF = vF (xHH + xHF + xFF )− (xHF + xFF )2 + x2HF .
From the first order conditions for H, vH = 2xHH and vH = 2xHF , and for
F , vF = 2(xHF +xFF ), the following equilibrium contributions are derived:
x∗HH =
vH
2 , x
∗
HF =
vH
2 and x
∗
FF = 0.
Player F ′s optimal abatement choice results in a corner solution as by
definition xFF ∈ [0,∞). The abatement choices constitute a unique Nash
equilibrium and the equilibrium welfare for players H and F is,
W ∗H =
v2H
2 (1.7)
and
W ∗F = vHvF . (1.8)
respectively.
Player H abates in country F up to the point where his marginal benefits
from abatement are equal to his marginal abatement costs in F . As player
F has lower marginal benefits from abatement than player H does, F will
not choose any abatement at all. That is, player H ′s GHG reduction in
country F fully crowds out player F ′s abatement. Player F free-rides on
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H ′s emission reductions.
1.4. Welfare Comparison
To assess the Clean Development Mechanism from a welfare perspective,
I compare the countries’ welfare in the three different cases. Firstly, the
welfare in the absence of the mechanism is compared to the welfare under
the mechanism. Secondly, I examine how the countries’ welfare differs in the
cases where country H (country F ) enjoys the preferential right regarding
GHG abatement in country F .
Proposition 1.1.
a) Country F ′s welfare is strictly higher under the CDM than without the
CDM.
b) If γ = 1, country H ′s welfare is strictly higher under the CDM than
without the CDM.
If γ = 0, country H ′s welfare is strictly higher under the CDM than
without the CDM, if and only if vH > 2vF .
Proof.
a) Let F have a preferential right. With the CDM, player F ′s welfare is
strictly higher than without the CDM since the difference between (1.6)
and (1.4) is vHvF/2− v2F/2, which is strictly positive.
Let H have a preferential right. With the CDM, player F ′s welfare is
strictly higher than without the CDM since the difference between (1.8)
and (1.4) is vHvF/2− v2F/4, which is strictly positive.
b) Let F have a preferential right (γ = 1). With the CDM, player H ′s
welfare is strictly higher than without the CDM since the difference between
(1.5) and (1.3) is (vH/2− vF/2)2, which is strictly positive.
Let H have a preferential right (γ = 0). With the CDM, player H ′s
welfare is strictly higher than without the CDM, if and only if vH > 2vF
since the difference between (1.7) and (1.3) is vH (vH/4− vF/2), which is
strictly positive if and only if vH > 2vF .
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Proposition 1 implies that, with the CDM, emission reductions in country F
increase compared to the Benchmark Case, due to player H ′s cross border
abatement in country F . At the same time, domestic emission reductions
by players F and H remain constant compared to the Benchmark Case if
F has a preferential right. If, however, H has a preferential right, player F
reduces his abatement contributions to zero compared to the Benchmark
Case, but player H overcompensates this reduction with his cross border
abatement such that overall emission reductions are the same in the two
cases with CDM.
In the case where F has the preferential right, abatement costs remain
constant with emission reductions for player F , whereas, in the case where
H has a preferential right, abatement costs drop to zero together with F ′s
emission reductions. The increase in overall abatement, together with un-
changed or decreased abatement costs, compared to the Benchmark Case,
leads to greater welfare under the CDM than without the CDM for country
F .
Like country F , country H also profits from the increased abatement com-
pared to the Benchmark Case. However, as this abatement increase is due
to player H ′s cross border abatement in country F , player H is the one
who has to pay the costs for the increase in emission reductions.
If γ = 1 (F has a preferential right), domestic abatement by countries F
and H remains the same as in the Benchmark Case and H ′s cross border
abatement simply adds to the Benchmark Case abatement. Under the ini-
tial assumption that vH > vF , the additional benefits from this cross border
abatement exceed player H ′s additional abatement costs and country H ′s
welfare is higher under the CDM than without the CDM.
If γ = 0 (H has a preferential right), domestic abatement by country H
remains the same as in the Benchmark Case, but F ′s emission reductions
drop to zero. As player H fully compensates this drop and, further, adds
the same amount of abatement as in the “F has a preferential right” case,
the additional abatement costs for H are higher in the case where H has
a preferential right than in the case where F has a preferential right. Fur-
thermore, the condition under which additional benefits exceed additional
costs is stronger in the latter case. That is, country H ′s welfare is higher
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under the CDM than without the CDM only if vH > 2vF . When this
condition is fulfilled, however, the CDM leads to a Pareto improvement.
In turn, if the two countries’ respective willingnesses to pay for abatement
were quite similar - i.e. vH > vF , but vH < 2vF - cost benefit considerations
would keep country H from cross border abatement in the case where H
has a preferential right. Country H would then rather leave the abatement
in F to country F because the supplementary abatement H could take on
in F would not add enough benefits to compensate for the additional costs.
I have now analyzed how the welfare in the two cases with CDM compares
to the welfare in the Benchmark Case. What remains to be seen is which
of the two cases with CDM the countries F and H prefer.
Proposition 1.2.
a) Country F ′s welfare is strictly lower in the case where F has a prefer-
ential right than in the case where H has a preferential right.
b) Country H ′s welfare is strictly higher in the case where F has a prefer-
ential right than in the case where H has a preferential right.
Proof.
a) Comparing (1.6) and (1.8) shows directly that F ′s welfare is strictly
lower when F has a preferential right than when H has a preferential right.
The difference between (1.6) and (1.8) is −v2F/4, which is strictly negative.
b) Comparing (1.5) and (1.7) shows directly that H ′s welfare is strictly
higher when F has a preferential right than whenH has a preferential right.
The difference between (1.5) and (1.7) is v2F , which is strictly positive.
Proposition 2 implies that if country F could decide on the allocation of
the preferential right, it would always opt for H to have the preferential
right. Likewise, when country H could decide on the allocation of the
preferential right, it would always opt for F to have the preferential right.
That is, both players prefer the case in which they themselves have higher
marginal abatement costs in country F than the other player does.
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Overall emission reductions and therewith the two countries’ benefits from
abatement are the same in both cases. Player F abates a positive amount
when he has the preferential right but does not abate at all when player H
has the preferential right. That is, F ′s abatement costs are positive in the
former and nil in the latter case. With equal benefits from abatement in
the two cases, country F ′s welfare is, therefore, strictly lower when F has
the preferential right than when H has the preferential right.
Player H adds to F ′s abatement when F has the preferential right, but,
when H has the preferential right, H not only compensates for F ′s abate-
ment from the “F has a preferential right” case but also adds the same
amount as it itself contributes in the “F has a preferential right” case.
That is, H abates more in the “H has a preferential right” case than in the
“F has a preferential right” case. Therefore, his abatement costs are higher
in the former than the latter case. With equal benefits from abatement in
the two cases, country H ′s welfare is therefore strictly higher when F has
the preferential right than when H has the preferential right.
Global welfare is the same in both cases with CDM. That is, when moving
from one case to the other, welfare is simply redistributed from one country
to the other.
1.5. Conclusion
The analysis of the simultaneous moves game shows that both countries
involved in CDM projects have a higher welfare with the Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism than without it. Also, global abatement is larger with the
mechanism than in its absence.18Regarding the industrialized country, wel-
fare is only larger for a parameter range where the industrialized country’s
18I do not consider the possible effect the crowding out in F might have on H ′s domestic
emission reductions. If H ′s intrinsic will to abate drives H ′s willingness to pay for
abatement, vH , H ′s domestic abatement remained unchanged and global abatement
was the same for both cases, the one where H has the preferential right and the
one where F has the preferential right. If, however, H ′s abatement obligation drives
H ′s willingness to pay for abatement, vH , H ′s domestic abatement differed for the
two cases, affecting individual and global welfare and possibly leading to a global
emission increase.
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willingness to pay for abatement is substantially larger than the develop-
ing country’s willingness to pay for abatement. With respect to the two
different cost scenarios under the CDM, which I have looked at, the two
countries have antithetic preferences. Both countries prefer the scenario
in which they themselves have higher marginal abatement costs than the
other country. Therefore, the industrialized country would pick the “F has
a preferential right” case, while the developing country would decide on the
“H has a preferential right” case if it had a choice. When the industrialized
country has the preferential right, the developing country can fully free-ride
on the industrialized country’s contributions, and its own abatement drops
to zero.
For future climate negotiations, the results indicate that the Clean De-
velopment Mechanism should be kept as a GHG offset mechanism, as the
developing country always profits from it. The industrialized country prof-
its from the mechanism, especially as long as the additionality principle is
fulfilled, but also for some parameter ranges in the absence of additionality.
Further, GHG emissions always decrease.
The parties to the climate convention can pursue different goals. They
could wish to get every country, including developing ones, to contribute,
or they might wish to increase contributions, but spare the developing coun-
tries, and have the industrialized countries carry the burden. Depending
on the goal, the parties to the convention have two different scenarios to
choose from. If they grant a preferential right regarding abatement in the
developing country to the developing country (compliance with the addi-
tionality principle), both countries will contribute; that is, the developing
country carries part of the burden. However, if the preferential right with
respect to abatement in the developing country is granted to the industri-
alized country (violation of the additionality principle), the only country
contributing will be the industrialized one. That is, at the same overall
amount of global abatement, the industrialized country takes on all the
abatement and the developing country is fully unburdened.
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Monitoring Abatement in the
Presence of an Import Quota
2.1. Introduction
The fight against climate change is a global public good. It makes no
difference for the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere at which place on
earth pollutants are abated. However, the choice of the place can make a
difference for the abatement costs that accrue.
From an economic view point, CO2 abatement should be carried out wher-
ever it is cheapest. This consideration was at the heart of the Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism (CDM) when it was launched as part of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol in 1997. The CDM enables firms from industrialized countries to in-
vest in registered CDM abatement projects abroad in developing countries.
For each metric tonne of CO2 abatement enabled by their investment, the
firms receive one certified emission reduction (CER) in return. Firms can
use the CERs generated by CDM projects to offset their domestic abate-
ment obligation stemming from the negotiated environmental agreement
that the Kyoto countries committed themselves to in 1997.19 CDM projects
range from methane avoidance in agriculture and photovoltaic power gen-
eration to large hydro power plants. Generally, any project that leads to
emission reductions compared to a counterfactual baseline is admissible as
19Governments pass the abatement obligations they committed to on to the firms under
their jurisdiction.
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a CDM project.20
The abatement of CO2 emissions, while generating welfare benefits, accrues
costs for the firms carrying out the abatement. Consequently, a government
intending to induce abatement by its firms needs to provide incentives for
these firms to select into abatement. That is, it needs to demand an amount
that is to be abated by each firm and punish shortcomings, both of which
is being done in reality.21 Presumably, while domestic abatement is easily
observed by the government, abatement abroad demands some more ob-
servation effort. In other words, governments have incomplete information
regarding abatement abroad and from this incomplete information arises
a monitoring problem for the government. This assessment is backed by
Kachi et al. (2014) mentioning that California is prejudiced against the
CDM due to the fear of having little control over abatement occurring
abroad.
Many governments allow the firms under their jurisdiction to participate
in the CDM, but not without imposing some restrictions regarding the
use of CERs. While Australia planned to allow 12.5% and South Korea
is planning to allow up to 50% of its firms’ abatement obligations to be
covered by Kyoto abatement units such as CERs (Kachi et al. 2014), the
European Union left it up to its member states to impose restrictions.22
The result was quotas that ranged between 0% and 22%, where Estonia is
the strictest and Germany the laxest country. This percentage of allocated
emission allowances is admissible in the form of CERs (Vasa 2011). Califor-
nia considered an alternative restriction, a discount for abroad abatement
certificates, but this chapter will focus on an import quota.23
Keeping in mind that CO2 abatement is a global public good and that
20A broad overview of the workings of the CDM in general can be found in Paulsson
(2009), while the course of a CDM project is explicitly explained in Section 1.2 of
this thesis.
21An example for Germany: According to paragraph 15 of the German legal code on
project mechanisms (§15, ProMechG), misreporting in validation or verification re-
ports for emission abatement can be punished with fines of up to 100.000 EUR.
22See the Appendix B for the Linking Directive of the European Union. Relevant
passages are highlighted
23Further restrictions imposed by the EU ETS, such as the exclusion of CERs from
nuclear power plants or forestry projects and the restriction of source countries to
Least Developed Countries, which have been active since 2012, are also not subject
to this analysis.
29
Monitoring Abatement in the Presence of an Import Quota
the efficient allocation of abatement would be one that exploits the lowest
cost abatement options worldwide, it is surprising to observe governments
discriminating against abatement carried out abroad. The discrimination
restricts the firms’ options, thereby not only forcing them to meet a specific
abatement obligation, but, further, forcing them to choose less cost efficient
abatement allocations than are possible in the absence of discrimination.
This chapter adds to the literature on the CDM. More specifically, it adds
to the literature on restricting the use of CERs generated under the CDM.
Previous papers mainly focused on the fact that restricting the use of CERs
breaks the pure offset character of the CDM (i.e. leads to emission reduc-
tions that can not be counted against the domestic abatement obligation)
and argued that the net atmospheric benefits that arose from this made
the governments’ failure to prevent non-additionality more acceptable.24
Schneider (2009), Alexeew et al. (2010), Bakker et al. (2011) and Francois
and Hamaide (2011) make this argument, but focus on restricting the use of
CERs by means of a discount. Ranson and Stavins (2012) consider a CER
limit and repeat the additionality argument. Also, Castro and Michaelowa
(2010), applying a graphic supply and demand analysis of the CER market,
and Braun et al. (forthcoming), using an empirical analysis to explain the
price spread between CERs and domestic European emission certificates,
draw on the same arguments for restricting CER imports and consider
quantity restrictions.
The chapter at hand also considers a quantity restriction, but seeks to
justify this restriction by the existence of a monitoring problem regarding
abatement abroad instead of by additionality concerns.
That is, this chapter examines the following question: Is it possible that the
monitoring problem mentioned above can provide a rational explanation
for the observed government decision to discriminate between abatement
generated at home and abatement generated abroad by means of a quota on
abroad abatement? To answer this question, I apply a classical monitoring
framework as defined by Becker (1968), extend it by an abatement cost
24Non-additional projects are projects that are being carried out under the CDM and
generate CERs, although they would have been taken on in the absence of the CDM
as well. Hence, those projects fail to offset emissions compared to a counterfactual
scenario without the CDM.
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minimization problem subject to a minimum abatement constraint and
introduce heterogeneous observability for abatement generated in different
regions. The analysis reveals that governments can still implement the
first best abatement allocation when information on abroad abatement is
incomplete. However, it further shows that, while implementable, the first
best abatement allocation is not the welfare maximizing one in the presence
of incomplete information. Rather, starting from no quota at all, welfare
under incomplete information increases when a quota is introduced and
some abatement is shifted from abroad to domestic abatement compared to
the first best allocation. This shift reduces the efficiency of the allocation,
but at the same time increases the firm’s incentive to comply, thereby
reducing the monitoring cost.
Whether or not the government wants to shift all of the abroad abatement
home or wants to allow for some abroad abatement depends on the mon-
itoring cost, the fine, the abatement obligation and the cost of the last
domestic and the first foreign unit of abatement. The smaller the monitor-
ing cost, the larger the fine, and the abatement obligation, the higher the
cost for the last unit of domestic, and the lower the cost for the first unit of
foreign abatement, the more likely is it that the government allows abroad
abatement.
To my knowledge I am the first one to consider a monitoring problem in
this context. However, there are papers that examine monitoring problems
in related environmental contexts. Arguedas (2008, 2013) both consider a
framework in which compliance with a general environmental standard can
only be observed by means of monitoring and in which monitoring is costly.
While Arguedas (2008) is after the socially optimal combination of stan-
dard and monitoring policy, Arguedas (2013), in an extension of the 2008
model, considers the optimality of a discount on the fine payable upon
noncompliance. His discount depends on the amount a firm invested in
abatement technologies. As Arguedas (2013) does, also I consider compli-
ance with an environmental standard, but I model a quota. Furthermore,
while the discount in Arguedas (2013) works in favor of the firms that
are being granted the discount, my quota applies to abatement generated
abroad and penalizes firms that are subject to it. While the two papers
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by Arguedas assume all abatement to be equally poorly observable, my
essential extension to Becker (1968) is that I introduce heterogeneity re-
garding the observability of abatement carried out in different regions. A
further paper, Arguedas and Rousseau (2015) also considers observability
differences, but it introduce the heterogeneity on the side of the observer,
as opposed to my heterogeneity on the side of the observed. In Arguedas
and Rousseau the national authority that sets the standard is unable to
observe the abatement being carried out, but a local agency that enforces
the standard can observe the abatement. The chapter at hand, in turn,
allows one governmental regulator that takes the emission standard as ex-
ogenously given to perfectly observe domestic abatement, but assumes that
abroad abatement is not observable free of cost for the regulator.
Stranlund and Chavez (2000) do not model a general environmental stan-
dard, but a transferable emissions permit system, with a monitoring prob-
lem. They require their firms to self report on their emissions and the
permits they hold and find that this self-reporting requirement can be used
to reduce monitoring costs. In this chapter, by contrast, the decrease in
monitoring probability, and consequently the expected monitoring costs,
results from implementing a second best abatement allocation where the
use of an import quota shifts some of the abroad abatement home.
The following section presents the theoretical framework. First, the firm’s
decision is analyzed, then the government’s decision, with and without an
import quota and under complete and incomplete information. Section 3
concludes this chapter.
2.2. Theoretical Framework
There is one government and one firm and there are two countries, home
H and foreign F .25
In the first stage, the government seeks to maximize welfare by choosing
its monitoring policy. As explained below in more detail, the monitoring
policy mainly consists of a monitoring probability µ ∈ [0, 1].
25This is equivalent to assuming one government and a continuum of homogeneous firms
of mass one.
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In the second stage the firm chooses its domestic and abroad abatement,
xH ∈ [0,∞) and xF ∈ [0,∞), with the intention of minimizing abatement
costs, taking an exogenous abatement obligation xmin > 0 and the govern-
ment’s monitoring probability µ as given. While the government considers
both, benefits, b (∑xi) with b′ (∑xi) > 0, b′′ (∑xi) = 0 and i ∈ {H,F},
and costs, c(xi) with c ′(xi), c ′′(xi) > 0, c (0) = 0 and i ∈ {H,F}, the firm
only cares about the cost of abatement. The abatement cost functions are
publicly known. Likewise, both the firm and the government can observe
domestic abatement. However, the government may not be able to observe
the amount of abroad abatement carried out by the firm.
The firm complies with government legislation whenever the sum of do-
mestic and abroad abatement matches or exceeds the abatement obligation
xmin. If the abatement sum falls short of xmin, the firm does not comply.In
case the firm does not comply and the non-compliance is detected, the
firm has to meet its abatement obligation ex post and, in addition, pay a
fine S > 0. For the government to detect a non-compliant firm it has to
monitor, and monitoring produces the monitoring cost m ≥ 0.
2.2.1. First Best
Under complete information, all abatement is observable for the govern-
ment and there is no need for monitoring. The firm chooses domestic and
abroad abatement xH and xF to minimize
C (xH , xF ) = c (xH) + c (xF )
subject to the condition that the sum of domestic and abroad abatement
must not fall short of the abatement obligation: xH + xF ≥ xmin.
Lemma 2.1.
Under complete information, the firm chooses the allocation
xFBH = xFBF = x
min/2.
Proof.
From the equilibrium condition c ′ (xH) = c ′ (xF ) and due to the assump-
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tion that c (·) is increasing, convex and the same for both countries fol-
lows that xFBH = xFBF . Together with the other equilibrium condition,
xFBH + xFBF = xmin, this implies that xFBH = xFBF = x
min/2. Since the firm
has to pay a fine S > 0 and fulfill its abatement obligation ex post if it
does not comply, it is optimal for the firm to comply.
As abatement costs increase progressively and are the same at home and
abroad, it is cost minimizing for the firm to abate both at home and abroad
and to equally distribute abatement between the two.
2.2.2. Second Best
Under incomplete information, the firm’s decision is no longer aligned with
the government’s decision, and the government has to monitor and punish
non-compliance to incentivize the firm to comply. For a given monitoring
policy, if the firm decides to comply, it will choose x∗H and x∗F .26 Since the
cost functions are commonly known, the government anticipates the opti-
mal choice of a compliant firm. Therefore, I assume that the government
always monitors the firm, if it observes that the firm’s domestic abatement
choice deviates from the optimal choice of a compliant firm. Otherwise,
the government monitors the firm with probability µ ∈ [0, 1).27 That is,
the government’s monitoring policy is
p (xH) =
µ if xH = x
∗
H
1 if xH 6= x∗H
. (2.1)
If the firm does not comply and is detected, in addition to fine S > 0, it has
to meet its abatement obligation ex post, i.e., choose additional (domestic
or abroad) abatement such that total abatement sums up to at least xmin.
Hence, if the firm initially chooses (x′H , x′F ) with x′H + x′F < xmin and is
detected, it has to pay S and to chooses additional abatement (x′′H , x′′F )
such that x′H + x′F + x′′H + x′′F ≥ xmin. I assume for simplicity that the
26Optimal choices of a compliant firm are marked with asterisks.
27I exclude µ = 1, for this is the less interesting case in which the firm is always
monitored.
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additional abatement of an initially non-compliant firm has to be disclosed
(or can be monitored by the government at no additional cost).
Consequently, if compliant (that is, when x′H + x′F ≥ xmin), the firm has
abatement cost
C (x′H , x′F ) = c (x′H) + c (x′F ) , (2.2)
while, if non-compliant (that is, when x′H + x′F < xmin), the firm has
expected abatement cost
E [C (x′H , x′F )] = c (x′H) + c (x′F ) + µ (S + c (x′′H) + c (x′′F )) . (2.3)
Moreover, I assume that the government values revenues (the fine) and the
firm’s profits equally. Therefore, for the government, which receives fine S
but at the same time takes into account the firm’s costs, the fine is welfare
neutral.
In addition to the exogenous minimum abatement obligation xmin the gov-
ernment can set a quota caping abroad abatement xF ≤ xmaxF . Backward
induction allows to solve for the firm’s equilibrium abatement and the gov-
ernment’s policy choices.
2.2.2.1. The Firm’s Decision
In the absence of a quota on abroad abatement, the firm chooses its
domestic and abroad abatement xH and xF in the second stage to minimize
the abatement cost in (2.2) and (2.3), taking into account the government’s
monitoring policy in (2.1).
Lemma 2.2.
a) If compliant, the firm chooses the first best domestic and abroad abate-
ment x∗H = x∗F = x
min/2.
b) If non-compliant, the firm chooses domestic abatement xH = xmin/2 and
abroad abatement xF = 0.
The proof of Lemma 2.2. can be found in Appendix B.
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As under complete information, when complying, the firm chooses the
smallest abatement sum ensuring compliance, xmin, and equally divides
abatement between domestic and abroad abatement to minimize the cost.
This is due to the fact that the abatement cost functions are convexly
increasing and the same in both countries.
Given the firms monitoring strategy, every domestic abatement choice ex-
cept the compliant firm’s optimal choice leads the government to monitor
with certainty. With certain monitoring and hence certain punishment,
choosing the compliant firm’s amount at home generates smaller expected
costs than any other choice for all levels of abroad abatement. That is,
the firm chooses a compliant firm’s level of abatement at home. How-
ever, abroad, where abatement is not observable for the government, the
expected costs are the smallest when the firm chooses no abatement at
all. This is due to the fact that fine S is constant and independent of the
amount of foregone abatement.
In the presence of a quota on abroad abatement, the firm chooses its
domestic and abroad abatement xH and xF in the second stage to minimize
the abatement cost in (2.2) and (2.3), taking into account the government’s
monitoring policy in (2.1) and subject to a binding quota for abroad abate-
ment (i.e., subject to the condition that xF ≤ xmaxF < x
min/2).
Lemma 2.3.
Given that the quota is binding,
a) the firm chooses domestic abatement x∗H = xmin − xmaxF and abroad
abatement x∗F = xmaxF if it is compliant.
b) the firm chooses domestic abatement xH = xmin − xmaxF and abroad
abatement xF = 0 if it is non-compliant, .28
Proof.
a) Given a binding quota x∗F = xmaxF < x
min/2 < xmin − xmaxF = x∗H . There-
28Where x∗H = xmin − xmaxF and x∗F = xmaxF , analogous to Lemma 2.2, also correspond
to the first best domestic and abroad abatement choices that would be derived under
complete information.
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fore, it holds that
c′ (x∗F ) < c′ (x∗H) .
If the firm chooses x′F > xmaxF the marginal costs are c′ (x′F ) > c′ (x∗F ). But
as the government only counts xF = xmaxF towards the firm’s abatement
obligation, xH must be x∗H = xmin − xmaxF to ensure compliance. With
allocation (x∗H , x′F ) the abatement cost is strictly higher than with (x∗H , x∗F ),
hence x′F > xmaxF can not be optimal.
Likewise, the choice x′F < xmaxF (and x′H > xmin−xmaxF ) can not be optimal,
as allocation (x′H , x′F ) would imply c′ (x′F ) < c′ (x∗F ) < c′ (x∗H) < c′ (x′H).
b) The proof for the compliant firm, follows the same line of argumentation
as the proof of Lemma 2.2.
Given a binding quota on abroad abatement, it is cheapest for the firm
to abate the exact amount of the quota abroad when complying. The
reason being that, with a binding quota, the optimal amount of abroad
abatement that the firm would choose in the absence of the quota is larger
than the amount allowed under that quota. Any allocation deviating from
the one that is optimal in the absence of the quota increases the abatement
costs, but the cost increase is larger the larger the deviation. The firm,
consequently, chooses the smallest deviation possible. At home, the firm
chooses the lowest possible amount guaranteeing compliance, given the
choice of an amount equal to the quota abroad.
Regarding the non-compliance choices the same logic applies as in the case
without the quota. Every domestic abatement choice except for the com-
pliant firm’s optimal choice leads the government to monitor with certainty.
That is, at home the firm chooses the compliant firm’s level of abatement.
However, abroad, where abatement is not observable for the government,
the firm chooses no abatement at all.
Any quota smaller than the efficient abroad abatement in the absence of the
quota is a binding quota. Therefore, for illustration purposes I hereafter
denote the quota as xmaxF = (x
min/2) −∆ which implies the compliance al-
location is (x∗H , x∗F ) = ((x
min/2) + ∆, (xmin/2)−∆) and the non-compliance
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allocation is (xH , xF ) = ((xmin/2) + ∆, 0). That is, compared to the opti-
mal allocation without a quota, some of the abroad abatement is shifted
homeward with a quota.
2.2.2.2. The Government’s Decision
The government can only affect the firm’s choice through the monitoring
policy it implements in the first stage. I assume that the government can
perfectly observe the domestic abatement of the firm, but abroad abate-
ment is initially unobserved and only disclosed upon request. Making this
request causes monitoring cost m for the government. That is, the govern-
ment balances the benefits of abatement, b (∑xi) with i = {H,F}, against
the monitoring cost. If the monitoring cost was very large compared to the
benefits of abatement, the government would never monitor to induce com-
pliance (the monitoring probability would be µ = 0) and the firm would
never comply. In this case there would be no monitoring problem. Thus,
I assume that the benefits of abatement are sufficiently high compared to
the monitoring cost, such that the government wants to monitor with a
positive probability and wants to induce compliance.
Proposition 2.1.
Under incomplete information, the government can implement the first best
abatement allocation xFBH = xFBF = x
min/2 by choosing the monitoring prob-
ability
µ∗ =
c
(
xmin
2
)
S + c
(
xmin
2
) .
Proof.
The firm chooses to comply whenever it is indifferent between compli-
ance and non-compliance: C (xmin/2, xmin/2) = E [C (xmin/2, 0)]. This is
the case if 2c (xmin/2) = µ (S + c (xmin/2)) + c (xmin/2), which reduces to
µ∗ = c(xmin/2)/(S+c(xmin/2)).
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The government can implement compliance with the monitoring probability
that makes the firm indifferent between compliance and non-compliance.
When compliance is induced and the monitoring probability is set opti-
mally, the expected welfare is
W ∗ = b
(∑
x∗i
)
−
∑
c (x∗i )− µ∗m,
with i = {H,F}.
Proposition 2.2.
Under incomplete information, the welfare maximizing choice differs from
the first best choice of abatement xFBH = xFBF = x
min/2. Instead, the govern-
ment prefers to set a strictly positive quota, such that x∗F < x
min/2.
Proof.
Using Lemma 2.3 and a quota, xmaxF = (x
min/2) − ∆, the compliant firm
chooses x∗H = (x
min/2) + ∆, x∗F = (x
min/2)−∆
and the non-compliant firm chooses xH = (xmin/2) + ∆ and xF = 0.
That is, the monitoring probability implementing compliance becomes
µ∗ (∆) =
c
(
xmin
2 −∆
)
S + c
(
xmin
2 −∆
) .
Then the corresponding optimal welfare is
W ∗ (∆) = b
(
xmin
)
− c
(
xmin
2 + ∆
)
− c
(
xmin
2 −∆
)
−
c
(
xmin
2 −∆
)
S + c
(
xmin
2 −∆
)m.
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Deriving the welfare with respect to ∆ yields
∂W ∗ (∆)
∂∆ = −c
′
(
xmin
2 + ∆
)
+ c′
(
xmin
2 −∆
)
+
(
S + c
(
xmin
2 −∆
))
c′
(
xmin
2 −∆
)
(
S + c
(
xmin
2 −∆
))2 m (2.4)
−
c
(
xmin
2 −∆
)
c′
(
xmin
2 −∆
)
(
S + c
(
xmin
2 −∆
))2 m. (2.5)
That is
∂W ∗
∂∆ |∆=0=
Sc′
(
xmin
2
)
(
S + c
(
xmin
2
))2m > 0,
as S, m and c′ (·) > 0.
Once information is incomplete and the government has to exert costly
monitoring to verify abroad abatement, the government faces a trade-
off. It is a trade-off between distorting the allocation of domestic and
abroad abatement and increasing the firm’s incentive to comply by re-
ducing the amount of abatement to be implemented abroad and thereby
reducing the monitoring probability necessary to induce compliance. Shift-
ing abroad abatement to home, starting from the first best allocation
xFBH = xFBF = x
min/2 where the distortion is zero, results in a negative
welfare effect from the distortion that is smaller than the positive welfare
effect from the increased compliance incentive of the firm. This is due to
the assumption of increasing, but equal abatement cost functions at home
and abroad.29
The introduction of a marginal shift increases welfare, but what remains
to be identified is the optimal shift from abroad to domestic abatement.
29If the abatement costs at home were larger than abroad, cH (·) ≥ cF (·)∀xH , xF ,
the condition under which welfare increases with a shift from abroad to domestic
abatement would no longer be always fulfilled. Rather, the difference between the
domestic and abroad abatement cost functions, cH (·) and cF (·), and their relation
to the monitoring cost m will then play a role.
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Claim 2.1.
If
c′ (0)
[
1 + m
S
]
− c′
(
xmin
)
< 0 (2.6)
then the optimal quota is such that ∆opt ∈ (0, xmin/2) and the amount of
abroad abatement is positive.
Proof.
Taking equation (2.4) at ∆ = xmin/2 yields
∂W ∗ (∆)
∂∆ |∆= x
min
2
= c′ (0)
[
1 + m
S
]
− c′
(
xmin
)
.
That is, ∂W (∆)/∂∆ |∆=(xmin/2)< 0 if condition (2.6) is fulfilled.
Since ∆ ∈ [0, xmin/2] by definition, ∂W (∆)/∂∆ |∆=(xmin/2)< 0 is sufficient for
∆opt < xmin/2 and from Proposition 2.2 is known that ∆opt > 0.
Welfare decreases in ∆ at the upper bound ∆ = xmin/2, if condition (2.6)
holds. Thus, reducing ∆ to ∆ < xmin/2 generates a welfare increase, imply-
ing that ∆opt < xmin/2 and abroad abatement is positive. Condition (2.6) is
more likely to be fulfilled the smaller marginal cost c′ (0) and monitoring
costsm and the larger fine S, abatement obligation xmin, and marginal cost
c′ (xmin). The intuition behind this is the following. A smaller monitoring
cost, makes the government more willing to allow for abroad abatement
that brings along the need for monitoring. A larger fine S makes the likeli-
hood for non-compliance smaller such that the government is more willing
to allow for the less observable abatement abroad.
A larger abatement obligation xmin increases the efficiency benefits from
dividing abatement between home and abroad, due to the convex cost
functions. Likewise, the more convex the costs functions, the larger are
efficiency benefits from dividing abatement between home and abroad. If
c′ (0) is small, the first unit of abroad abatement is cheap and if c′ (xmin) is
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large, the last unit of domestic abatement is expensive, thus, the govern-
ment would want to allow for abroad abatement and shift some domestic
abatement abroad.30
If condition (2.6) is violated the solution for ∆opt may be such that no
abroad abatement is allowed, provided that the assumptions over the cost
functions ensure that welfare is strictly concave in ∆.31 However, there is
empirical evidence for abroad abatement, suggesting that the solution for
∆opt should be an interior one, such that abroad abatement occurs.
2.3. Conclusion
This chapter considers a classical monitoring framework with a representa-
tive firm that minimizes abatement costs subject to an emission standard.
Further, the regulator monitoring the firm faces heterogeneous observabil-
ity of abatement carried out at home versus carried out abroad. I find
that it is feasible for a regulator to choose its policy such that the first
best abatement allocation is implemented even under incomplete informa-
tion regarding abroad abatement. I show, however, that this first best
allocation is not socially optimal under incomplete information. In fact, a
government concerned with welfare maximization should apply a quota to
restrict the use of abroad abatement certificates. Such a quota, inducing a
shift from abroad to domestic abatement, reduces the firm’s incentive for
non-compliance. As non-compliance becomes less likely, the government
can induce compliance via a smaller monitoring probability than without
a quota, which implies that expected monitoring costs are smaller. The
quota, of course, simultaneously distorts the abatement allocation of the
firm away from the efficient allocation, which affects welfare negatively.
However, at the margin, this negative distortion effect is smaller than the
positive effect reducing the monitoring expenditure. That is, at least a
small quota on abroad abatement should always be welfare enhancing in
30For quadratic cost functions c′ (0)=0, which implies that condition (2.6) would then
always be fulfilled.
31Convexity of the cost function c (·) does not guarantee concavity of the welfare func-
tion, due to the last term of the welfare function −c(xmin/2−∆)m/(S+c(xmin/2−∆)),
containing the monitoring probability of the government.
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this framework. The results might not apply if the policy measure of choice
was not a quota, but a discount on/an allowability reduction for abroad
abatement.
Furthermore, my results suggest that while a small quota on abroad abate-
ment should be welfare enhancing, the government might not want to fully
prohibit abroad abatement altogether, but might want to allow for some.
The government is more likely to allow for abroad abatement, the smaller
the monitoring cost and the cost for the first unit of abroad abatement and
the larger the fine for non-compliance, the abatement obligation and the
cost of the last unit of domestic abatement.
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Chapter 3.
Reduced Allowability and the
Allocation of Emission
Abatement
3.1. Introduction
To fight climate change, industrialized countries have agreed to emission
reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. These emission reduction
obligations implicitly determine emission caps for many firms within the
covered countries. Effectively, firms receive emission allowances up to a
predefined cap. The firms emit Green House Gas (GHG) as a byproduct
of their production process, and they may freely do so as long as they
have emission allowances to counteract them. All emissions that exceed
the cap have to be offset. Firms can offset these excess emissions either
by abating at home, by buying emission allowances from other firms that
have an excess capacity, or by using the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM).32 The CDM is a GHG offset mechanism introduced in paragraph
12 of the Kyoto Protocol, which allows firms from industrialized countries
to abate in developing countries exploiting the latters’ lower abatement
costs. For each metric tonne of CO2 abatement under the CDM, industri-
alized country firms receive one emission allowance, a so called Certified
32Home abatement could involve domestic abatement action such as changing the pro-
duction technology, e.g., by introducing carbon filters or it could imply that firms
reduce their goods production to reduce emissions.
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Emission Reduction (CER), in return. CERs can then be used to offset
excess emissions.33
Scholars and politicians have raised several concerns over the CDM.34 The
most prominent and much-cited ones are the additionality problem and the
low-hanging fruits issue.
The additionality problem arises when CERs are paid out for emission re-
ductions that would have also occurred in the absence of the CDM. Emis-
sion reductions occurring in the absence of the CDM could result either
from foreign direct investment projects or from domestic projects of the
developing country itself. When CERs are paid out for such non-additional
emission reductions they effectively increase emissions above the Kyoto tar-
get instead of reducing them to meet the target. This happens due to the
fact that the CDM is a pure offset mechanism which implies that abating
one unit abroad means emitting one unit more at home. (see e.g. Greiner
and Michaelowa 2003).
The low-hanging fruits issue arises when industrialized counties make use of
the cheapest abatement options in the developing world, thereby crowding
out cheap future abatement options of developing countries. The idea is
that developing counties will face abatement obligations on their own in the
future and that the crowding out of cheap future abatement options will
leave them with high cost abatement only. High cost abatement, however,
might prevent the developing countries from abating at all.35
Mainly driven by the additionality concern mentioned above, governments
have introduced restrictions on CERs. Some introduced quotas and others
thought about discounts for non-domestic abatement units. This happened
despite the fact that restricting the use of abroad abatement stands in con-
trast to the economic argument behind the CDM. The mechanism was in-
tended to be a market mechanism allocating abatement efficiently between
abatement options all over the globe. That means that, from an efficiency
33A detailed explanation of the CDM process can be found in Section 1.2 of this thesis.
34A general overview of the concerns regarding the CDM is provided in Paulsson (2009)
or Bakker et al. (2011).
35On the low-hanging fruits issue, see e.g. Rose et al. (1999) and Narain and van’t
Veld (2008). Chapter 1 of this thesis provides a static analysis of crowding out in
this context. A further paper dealing with crowding out of future abatement in the
context of climate policy is Elsayyad and Morath (forthcoming).
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viewpoint one should expect no discounting, but rather full allowability.
Quotas are used in the EU and were planned in Australia, and a discount
was discussed in California. The Californian government wanted to allow
CERs to be imported at a rate of 1.25 to 1 domestic abatement unit, which
is equivalent to a discount of 20% on CERs (Pew Center 2009). While
domestic emission allowances offset 1 tonne of CO2 equivalent, then, CERs
would only offset 20% of this tonne. In that case, CERs are, so to say, less
allowable to the abatement obligations than domestic emission allowances
are.36
The hope was that such a discount or allowability reduction generates real
emission reductions, breaking the pure offset character of the mechanism
and thereby reducing the severity of the additionality problem.37 In this
chapter I abstract from other restrictions on CERs and focuses on a price
instrument as it was discussed for California. That is, I analyze how an
allowability or discount rate for CERs affects the equilibrium allocation of
domestic and abroad abatement. I will examine whether or not reduced
allowability necessarily leads to a decrease of abatement in developing coun-
tries and if not, under which condition abroad abatement might actually
increase as a reaction to reduced allowability.
To answer these questions, I employ a cost minimization framework with
a representative firm facing an abatement obligation. Comparative stat-
ics with respect to the allowability rate show that the effect of reduced
allowability, both on domestic abatement in the industrialized country as
well as on abroad abatement under the CDM, can be decomposed in a
substitution and a quantity effect. The substitution effect is similar to a
substitution effect caused by a change in the relative "prices" of domestic
and abroad abatement. More precisely, the substitution effect corresponds
to the change in abatement stemming from a compensated relative decrease
in the allowability of CERs. The quantity effect measures the change re-
sulting from the increased need for abatement when previously used CERs
36Furthermore, the EU ETS completely excludes the import of some CERs from spe-
cific non-supported projects (nuclear power, forestry). Also, from 2012 onwards the
import of CERs generated in advanced developing countries is prohibited. However,
these restrictions will not be subject to my analysis.
37Schneider (2009) makes this argument and Alexeew et al. (2010), Bakker et al. (2011)
and Francois and Hamaide (2011) followed in the same spirit.
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are less allowable.
I find that domestic abatement increases as a result of an allowability re-
duction for CERs. Both partial effects, the substitution and the quantity
effect induce this increase. However, the effect of an allowability reduc-
tion on abroad abatement is ambiguous. While the quantity effect again
works towards an abatement increase, the substitution effect points in the
opposite direction and works towards a decrease. Which of the two domi-
nates the other and therefore the direction of the overall effect depends on
the policy advantage at home weighted with domestic relative to abroad
equilibrium abatement and the abatement elasticity of marginal domestic
abatement costs. I show that, under plausible assumptions, abroad abate-
ment can increase as a result of a relative allowability reduction for CERs.
The results are robust to the introduction of a secondary market for emis-
sion certificates as long as the price is endogenous, i.e. reacts to changes
in the allowability of CERs.
The decomposition of the change in abatement induced by a changed al-
lowability rate in substitution and quantity effect might remind the reader
of the textbook Slutsky decomposition. However, decomposing the effect
a relative price change has on a household’s consumption decision is not
the analog to the problem I analyze in the chapter at hand, but the dual
problem is. One could think of two goods being consumed by a house-
hold and utility weights for each of these goods. Then, a change in the
utility weight of one good imposes a quantity and substitution effect on a
consumer’s choice of how much to expend on one or the other good. This
utility weight is analogous to my allowability rate on abroad abatement
certificates.
Regarding the stated goal of weakening the additionality problem, my re-
sults are in line with the policy maker’s intention. Effective emission re-
ductions increase with an allowability reduction, and the CDM moves from
pure offsetting to actual GHG abatement. However, the issue of crowding
out might become more severe with an allowability reduction. As men-
tioned above, I find that abroad abatement does not necessarily decrease
as a reaction to an allowability reduction, but might also increase. When
crowding out is an issue, this issue worsens as abroad abatement increases.
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Thematically, this chapter joins the literature on permit trade with offset,
in which allowances from offset efforts are restricted. In this context Braun
et al. (forthcoming) try to explain the price spread between European
Emission Allowances (EUAs) and certificates from the CDM. They find
that CER import restrictions have explanatory power for this spread and
that the introduction of such restrictions reduces the demand for CERs.
However, they do not consider the choice between producing EUAs or CERs
and their import restriction is a quantity restriction that specifies how many
domestic emissions are allowed to be offset by CERs instead of EUAs. I,
in turn, define the import restriction as the fraction of CERs generated
abroad which is allowed to be imported to the ETS. Braun et al. (forth-
coming) are silent on the amount of CERs generated, i.e. the amount of
abatement occurring abroad, whereas I am focusing on the change in this
amount. Klemick (2012) defines the import restriction in a similar way
as I do, namely as the trading ratio between offset credits and GHG al-
lowances. That is: the fraction of an EUA that a firm gets for one CER
generated abroad. However, she looks for the optimal discount parameter
in a world with three GHG emitting sectors where only one of them faces
an emission cap and emission leakage occurs between the sectors.38 She
finds that a discount or allowability rate smaller than one is optimal when
sectors are only partially covered and leakage occurs between covered and
uncovered sectors. She further states that a discount rate smaller than one
can be optimal even in the absence of leakage, if the emission baseline is
not stringent enough or when the emission cap is too lose. The effect of an
allowability reduction on the abatement decision is not a part of her anal-
ysis. I, however, focus precisely on this effect and its decomposition into
quantity and substitution effects. Bréchet et al. (2012) model the CDM as
38The term “leakage” refers to an increase of emissions in the uncovered sector resulting
from a decrease of emissions in the covered sector. Leakage can occur for various
reasons. One reason could be: Being covered by the environmental policy increases
the production cost of the covered sector relative to the uncovered one, at constant
demand, resulting in a production shift towards the uncovered sector. This produc-
tion shift is accompanied by an emission increase in the covered sector. Another
reason could be: In sectors that place a restriction on the use of polluting goods the
demand for these goods decreases, which leads to a decrease of the prices for these
goods. Consequently, sectors that are not subject to any restrictions buy more of
the polluting goods and end up emitting more.
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part of a global market for emission reductions but do not consider changes
in the (discount/allowability) rate of CERs.
The following section introduces the theoretical framework for the case
where a firm can simply generate domestic and abroad abatement. It dis-
plays the equilibrium analysis, comparative statics and the results. Section
3 extends the model introducing a third abatement option, namely buying
emission credits on a secondary market. The analysis first focuses on the
case with an exogenous price for bought credits before it examines the one
with an endogenous price. Section 4 concludes.
3.2. Theoretical Framework
3.2.1. Model
There is one representative firm that has to fulfill an abatement obligation
xmin > 0.39 To fulfill its abatement obligation the firm can either abate at
home, xH , or abroad, xF .40 However, while one unit of domestic abatement,
xH , fully counts towards the abatement obligation, one unit of abroad
abatement, xF , counts only as α units towards the abatement obligation.
That means that xmin = xH + αxF , where α ∈ (0, 1], is the allowability
parameter for emission reductions carried out abroad.41
Abatement, xH and xF , generates abatement costs. The cost functions
mapping these costs differ between home and abroad. That is, abatement
39xmin > 0 is exogenously given and results from the firm’s output production decision
and the emission allowances the firm received, prior to this analysis. The firm’s out-
put production generates emissions as by-product. Emission allowances offset these
emissions, but those emissions that exceed the allowances constitute the abatement
obligation, xmin.
40Home abatement could be a production reduction or refitting factories, while abroad
abatement can also include the use of new factories that generate less emissions than
a counterfactual baseline.
41The firm does not interact with other firms. That is, firms neither compete on the
output market, nor do they compete with others with respect to abatement costs,
in the sense that abatement becomes more expensive the more abatement projects
are already carried out by others. I deliberately abstract from strategic interaction
between firms to focus on the effects that occur when a firm’s isolated decision
between domestic and abroad abatement is distorted by an allowability reduction
for abroad abatement certificates.
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xH causes abatement cost cH = h(xH), while xF causes cost cF = f(xF ).
The cost functions h(·) and f(·) are assumed to be increasing, strictly con-
vex, continuous and differentiable with h′(xH) > 0, h′′(xH) > 0, f ′(xF ) > 0,
f ′′(xF ) > 0 and h(0) = f(0) = 0.
The firm’s objective is to meet its abatement need xmin at the lowest pos-
sible costs. That is, the firm chooses its domestic and foreign abatement
xH , xF ∈ [0,∞) to minimize the abatement cost, C = cH + cF , subject to
its minimum abatement constraint, xH + αxF ≥ xmin.
min
xH ,xF
h (xH) + f (xF )
s.t. xmin ≤ xH + αxF .
The firm’s optimal choice of domestic and abroad abatement equalizes the
marginal cost for emission reduction at home and abroad,
h ′(x∗H) =
1
α
f ′(x∗F ). (3.1)
Meanwhile, the minimum abatement constraint must be binding,
xmin = xH + αxF . (3.2)
That is, the equilibrium amount of domestic abatement, x∗H , is implicitly
characterized by:
h ′ (x∗H)−
1
α
f ′
( 1
α
(
xmin − x∗H
))
= 0, (3.3)
while the equilibrium amount of abroad abatement, x∗F , solves equation
h ′
(
xmin − αx∗F
)
− 1
α
f ′ (x∗F ) = 0. (3.4)
Equations (3.3) and (3.4) show that optimal abatement, x∗H and x∗F , de-
pends on the marginal cost of domestic and abroad abatement, on the
abatement obligation, xmin, and on the allowability rate for emission re-
ductions carried out abroad, α.
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3.2.2. Effect of an Allowability Reduction
Equations (3.3) and (3.4) suggest that changes in the allowability rate α
do affect equilibrium abatement. It remains to be seen how equilibrium
abatement is affected. What are the effects dx∗H/dα and dx∗F/dα of reducing
α? Total differentiation of equations (3.1) and (3.2) yields,42
dx∗H
dα
=−
1
α
f ′ (x∗F )
1
α
f ′′ (x∗F ) + αh ′′ (x∗H)
−
1
α
f ′′ (x∗F )x∗F
1
α
f ′′ (x∗F ) + αh ′′ (x∗H)
(3.5)
and
dx∗F
dα
=
1
α2
f ′ (x∗F )
1
α
f ′′ (x∗F ) + αh ′′ (x∗H)
− h
′′ (x∗H)x∗F
1
α
f ′′ (x∗F ) + αh ′′ (x∗H)
. (3.6)
The overall effect of an increase in the allowability rate α on the level of
optimal domestic and abroad abatement consists of a substitution effect
(SE) and a quantity effect (QE). For equations (3.5) and (3.6), the first
term on the right hand side is the SE and the second term is the QE.
The SE is the change in abatement solely induced by the change in rela-
tive allowability, while the QE is the change in abatement induced by the
need for additional abatement resulting from the allowability reduction for
abroad abatement.
Figure 3.1 graphically displays the decomposition in substitution and quan-
tity effect. The old equilibrium lies where the black dotted, downward-
sloping minimum abatement line is tangent to a solid black iso-cost-curve
- the firm abates x0H at home and x0F abroad. In doing so, the firm ful-
fills its abatement obligation xmin, as the combination lies on the black
dotted line that represents all combinations of domestic and abroad abate-
ment, which fulfill the abatement obligation. Decreasing α changes the
relative valuation of domestic and abroad abatement. Domestic abate-
ment becomes relatively more valuable and abatement abroad relatively
42See Appendix C for intermediate steps.
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Figure 3.1.: The Effect of an Allowability Reduction for Abroad Abate-
ment Certificates
less valuable. The black dotted line spins outward around its y-intercept
and becomes the solid black, downward-sloping line. The new equilibrium
lies where the solid black, new minimum abatement line, is tangent to a
solid black iso-cost-curve. Abatement at home and abroad amounts to x2H
and x2F . The difference x2H − x0H gives the overall effect of a decrease in
α on domestic abatement, the difference x2F − x0F gives the overall effect
of a decrease in α on abatement abroad. However, the overall effect can
be decomposed into two partial effects: a substitution effect (SE) and a
quantity effect (QE). To isolate the SE, I look at the effect that occurred if
the firm was exactly compensated for a decrease in α with a smaller abate-
ment obligation xmin such that it could still uphold the old equilibrium
abatement. The compensated minimum abatement line is the dashed gray,
downward-sloping line. With this compensated minimum abatement line,
the equilibrium abatement was x1H and x1F . Now the difference x1H − x0H
and x1F − x0F provides the isolated SE and the difference x2H − x1H and
x2F − x1F the isolated QE of a decrease in α on the abatement at home and
abroad. While both SE and QE go in the opposite direction of a change
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in α for domestic abatement, this is only true for the QE in case of abroad
abatement. The SE of abroad abatement goes in the same direction as the
change in α. As indicated in the introduction, the resemblance with the
textbook Slutsky decomposition, depicting the substitution and income ef-
fect of a relative price change for a consumer choosing between two goods,
is not coincidental.43 However, to be precise, it is not exactly the textbook
case that is analogous to my problem at hand, but its dual problem.44
Likewise, in the abatement decision at hand, the firm minimizes its abate-
ment cost, subject to a minimum abatement constraint, by optimally choos-
ing its domestic and foreign abatement. As the allowability of abroad
abatement decreases, the equilibrium abatement decision changes. This
effect on equilibrium abatement is then decomposed into a substitution ef-
fect resulting from the change in relative allowability and a quantity effect
resulting from the fact that, as foreign abatement counts less, the original
equilibrium abatement falls short of the minimum abatement requirement.
That is, domestic and possibly also abroad abatement has to increase to
fill the shortfall.
Proposition 3.1.
Both partial effects of a reduction in allowability α, the substitution and
quantity effects, on optimal domestic abatement, x∗H , are negative. There-
fore, the optimal amount of investment in domestic abatement, x∗H , in-
creases, as allowability α decreases.
Proof.
The denominator of equation (3.5) is positive, as α ∈ (0, 1] and h ′′ (·),
f ′′ (·) > 0 due to the strict convexity of cost functions h (·), f (·).
43E.g. Mas-Colell et al. (1995) cover the Slutsky decomposition.
44In the dual problem, an individual minimizes its consumption expenditure while keep-
ing its utility constant. The individual does so by optimally choosing the consump-
tion amounts of two different goods. Suppose now that the two different goods have
different utility weights for the deciding individual and that the utility weight for
one of the goods decreases. The decreased utility weight affects the distribution of
consumption between the two goods. This consumption effect can be decomposed
into a substitution effect resulting from the change in relative utility weights and a
quantity effect resulting from the fact that consumption now falls short of fulfilling
the original utility level. Either the consumption of one or the other good, or of
both goods has to increase to fill this shortfall. This, in turn, leads to an increase in
expenditure.
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Therefore, SEH < 0 , as − (1/α) f ′ (x∗F ) is negative. This is due to α ∈ (0, 1]
and the assumption of continuously increasing abroad abatement costs.
Furthermore, QEH ≤ 0, as − (1/α)x∗Ff ′′ (x∗F ) is non-positive. This is due
to the fact that α ∈ (0, 1], that xF ∈ [0,∞) and that f(·) is strictly
convex.
The allowability reduction makes domestic abatement more valuable rel-
ative to foreign abatement. Hence, the optimal domestic abatement in-
creases. This explains the negative SEH in equation (3.5). Regarding the
negative QEH in equation (3.5), the argument is the following: as allowabil-
ity α decreases, the original abatement allocation of domestic and abroad
abatement is no longer sufficient to comply with the minimum abatement
obligation xmin.45 This is due to the fact that, after the decrease in the
allowability rate, only a fraction of the formerly allowed abroad abatement
can be used as offset. The amount of allowable abatement x0H +αx0F , where
the superscript denotes the old equilibrium, falls short of the obligation
xmin. This shortfall has to be compensated with an abatement increase.
The increase can result from increasing domestic and abroad abatement.
Therefore, the QEH is negative. As both partial effects, of an allowability
reduction on domestic abatement are negative, so is the cumulative effect
of the two. That is, domestic abatement reacts with an increase to the
allowability reduction.For the effect of an allowability reduction on abroad
abatement, dx∗F/dα, the results are less straightforward.
Proposition 3.2.
While the substitution effect of a reduction in allowability α on optimal
abroad abatement x∗F is positive, the quantity effect is negative. Therefore,
abroad abatement increases as a result of a decrease in allowability α if
and only if the value of domestic relative to abroad equilibrium abatement
is smaller than the abatement elasticity of marginal domestic abatement
costs.
That is, if x∗H/αx∗F < εh ′(x∗H),x∗H , where εh ′(x∗H),x∗H = h
′′ (x∗H)
(
x∗H/h ′(x∗H)
)
.
45The prerequisite for this is that abroad abatement, occurs in the original equilibrium.
If x∗F was zero, the QEH would be as well.
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Proof.
The denominator of equation (3.6) is positive, as α ∈ (0, 1] and h ′′ (·),
f ′′ (·) > 0 due to the strict convexity of cost functions h (·), f (·).
Therefore, SEF > 0, as (1/α2) f ′ (x∗F ) is positive. This is due to α ∈ (0, 1]
and the assumption of continuously increasing abroad abatement costs.
However, QEF ≤ 0, as −h ′′(x∗H)x∗F is non-positive. This is due to the
assumptions that xF ∈ (0,∞]and that h (·) is strictly convex.
From SEF > 0 and QEF ≤ 0 follows directly that
dx∗F/dα < 0 if SEF < −QEF , while dx∗F/dα ≥ 0 if SEF ≥ −QEF .
That is, dx∗F/dα < 0 for (1/α) f ′ (x∗F ) < αh ′′ (x∗H)x∗F
and dx∗F/dα ≥ 0 for (1/α) f ′ (x∗F ) ≥ αh ′′ (x∗H)x∗F .
As in equilibrium (1/α) f ′ (x∗F ) = h ′ (x∗H), this is equivalent to
dx∗F
dα
< 0 iff 1
αx∗F
<
h ′′ (x∗H)
h ′ (x∗H)
and dx
∗
F
dα
≥ 0 iff 1
αx∗F
≥ h
′′ (x∗H)
h ′ (x∗H)
,
which is again equivalent to
dx∗F
dα
< 0 iff x
∗
H
αx∗F
< εh ′(x∗H),x∗H and
dx∗F
dα
≥ 0 iff x
∗
H
αx∗F
≥ εh ′(x∗H),x∗H .
Decreasing the allowability of abroad abatement makes domestic abate-
ment more valuable relative to abroad abatement. This works towards a
decrease of optimal abroad abatement and explains the positive SEF in
equation (3.6). Regarding the negative QEF in equations (3.6), the same
argument holds as for Proposition 1: as allowability α decreases, the orig-
inal abatement allocation of domestic and abroad abatement no longer
suffices to comply with the minimum abatement obligation xmin. This
shortage has to be compensated with an abatement increase. The increase
can result from increasing domestic and abroad abatement, therefore the
QEF is negative.
55
Reduced Allowability and the Allocation of Emission Abatement
As substitution and quantity effects point into different directions and nei-
ther clearly outweighs the other, an allowability reduction can a priori
increase abroad abatement, leave it unchanged or decrease it.
The case where abroad abatement decreases as a result of an allowability
reduction is unsurprising. This is the case in which the positive SEF out-
weighs the negative QEF . That means that the overall effect of a decrease
in allowability α on abroad abatement goes in the same direction as the
corresponding substitution effect does.
More interesting is the case of Proposition 3.2, in which abroad abatement
increases due to the allowability reduction. An increase of abroad abate-
ment occurs when the negative QEF outweighs the positive SEF . This
is the case when a relatively large part of the additional abatement need
resulting from a decreased α is covered by expanding abroad abatement -
of the total quantity effect QEH+QEF , i.e. of the increase in the firm’s
overall abatement, a relatively large part is allotted to abroad abatement.
Generally, either domestic abatement or abroad abatement, or both, can
increase to fill the additional abatement need, but the increase of abroad
abatement will be strong enough to overcompensate the abatement reduc-
tion due to the relative change in allowability only if the negative QEF on
abroad abatement outweighs the positive SEF on abroad abatement. That
is, abroad abatement increases if the following is true:
x∗H
αx∗F
< εh ′(x∗H),x∗H . (3.7)
The left hand side of condition (3.7) is domestic over abroad equilibrium
abatement where abroad abatement is discounted by the allowability rate α
such that the entire expression is displayed in domestic abatement units. If
this relative value of domestic to abroad abatement is smaller than the elas-
ticity of marginal domestic abatement costs, abroad abatement increases
with a reduction in allowability α. Condition (3.7) is more likely to be
fulfilled if (i) the policy advantage at home is small (alpha is large) and (ii)
the marginal abatement cost at home at the optimum reacts strongly to
increases in domestic abatement. The condition implies that abroad abate-
ment increases as a reaction to an allowability reduction when the policy
advantage at home weighted with relative domestic equilibrium abatement
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is smaller than the reaction of the marginal domestic abatement costs to a
1% increase of domestic abatement. Further, for h ′′ (x∗H)→ 0 the condition
would never be fulfilled, but as h ′′ (x∗H) gets larger so does the probability
that condition (3.7) is fulfilled. That is, the more convex domestic abate-
ment costs are in equilibrium, the more likely is it that abroad abatement
increases with a decrease in α.The intuition behind this is that a decrease in
α makes abroad abatement more expensive relative to domestic abatement
but, as long as positive amounts of abroad abatement are carried out, also
increases the amount of effective abatement needed to meet the abatement
obligation. As abroad abatement becomes more expensive, the firm re-
duces abroad abatement and increases domestic abatement. In addition to
that, however, the firm must increase its overall abatement to ensure that
the abatement obligation is met. This increase will be covered solely by a
domestic abatement increase when marginal domestic abatement costs are
close to constant. In this case, all additional units of domestic abatement
cost are nearly the same as the last unit in the pre-change equilibrium.
However, as soon as domestic abatement costs are sufficiently convex in
equilibrium, that is, as soon as the costs for additional units of domestic
abatement increase sufficiently quickly, the increase will be covered by both
an increase in domestic and in abroad abatement.
3.3. Alternative Abatement Option: Buying
Certificates on a Secondary Market
So far, I have assumed that a firm can only decide between actively abating
at home or abroad. However, the firm might have an additional option:
buying emission allowances on a secondary market. One of these allowances
is equivalent to the abatement of one tonne of CO2 equivalent and fully
allowable to the firm’s abatement obligation.46The firm I have in mind is
subject to an emission trading scheme (ETS) and affected by the change
46I do not make a distinction between allowances generated at home or abroad. Al-
lowances xA can be generated both ways, but are measured in units of domestic
allowances.
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in the allowability rate. It also uses the Clean Development Mechanism.
This firm can buy allowances xA at price p.
3.3.1. Exogenous Price
Suppose a firm faces an exogenous price p on the secondary market for
emission certificates. That is, the firm’s abatement decision has no effect
on the price and, therefore, neither has a change in α.47 The firm can either
be efficient or inefficient. If efficient, the firm has low marginal abatement
costs and sells abatement units on the market. If inefficient, the firm has
high marginal abatement costs and buys abatement units on the market.48
Independent of being a seller or buyer of emission certificates, the firm
minimizes:
min
xH ,xF ,xA
h (xH) + f (xF ) + pxA
s.t. xmin ≤ xH + αxF + xA,
where xA < 0 if the firm is efficient and xA > 0 if the firm is inefficient.
This yields the first order conditions:
p = h ′ (x̃H) =
1
α
f ′ (x̃F ) (3.8)
and
xmin = x̃H + αx̃F + x̃A. (3.9)
Again, x̃A < 0 if the firm is efficient and x̃A > 0 if the firm is inefficient.49
Condition (3.8) ensures that marginal abatement costs are equalized be-
tween the three abatement options. The marginal cost of buying (marginal
benefit of selling) abatement is simply the price. Condition (3.9) secures
47Only one firm or a small fraction of firms that is subject to the ETS and uses the
CDM is affected by the allowability change.
48Low marginal abatement costs imply that h ′ (x∗H) = (1/α) f ′ (x∗F ) < p. High marginal
abatement costs imply that h ′ (x∗H) = (1/α) f ′ (x∗F ) > p, where x∗H and x∗F corre-
spond to the optimal choices in the case without a secondary market in the previous
section.
49x̃H , x̃F and x̃A denote equilibrium choices.
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that the minimum abatement obligation is fulfilled in equilibrium. Let x̃AS
denotes the equilibrium supply of allowances sold if the firm is a seller and
x̃AD the equilibrium demand for allowances bought if the firm is a buyer.
Proposition 3.3.
When buying emission certificates constitutes an additional abatement op-
tion and prices are exogenous, a decrease in allowability α has no effect on
domestic abatement. However, abroad abatement and the number of sold
allowances each decrease if the firm is a seller, while bought allowances
increase if the firm is a buyer.
Proof.
Total differentiation of equations (3.8) and (3.9) results in the following ef-
fects of a change in allowability α on domestic and abroad abatement:
dx̃H
dα
= 1
h ′′(x̃H)
dp
dα
and dx̃F
dα
= 1
α
f ′(x̃F )
f ′′(x̃F )
.
These effects are independent of the firm being a seller or buyer of emission
certificates. But the effect on the choice of how much to sell/buy, of course,
depends on being a seller or buyer. If the firm is a seller, it is
dx̃AS
dα
= f
′(x̃F )
f ′′(x̃F )
+ x̃F ,
if the firm is a buyer, it is
dx̃AD
dα
= − f
′(x̃F )
f ′′(x̃F )
− x̃F .
As p is by assumption exogenous, that is, dp/dα = 0, the effect on domestic
abatement is
dx̃H
dα
= 1
h ′′(x̃H)
dp
dα
= 0.
The effect on abroad abatement is
dx̃F
dα
= 1
α
f ′(x̃F )
f ′′(x̃F )
> 0,
this results directly from the assumption of continuously increasing and
convex abroad abatement costs and from α ∈ (0, 1]. The effect on sold
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abatement is
dx′AS
dα
= f
′(x̃F )
f ′′(x̃F )
+ x̃F > 0,
the first term is positive due to the assumption of continuously increasing
and convex abroad abatement costs, and the second term is non-negative,
as xF ∈ [0,∞). Likewise, the effect on bought abatement is
dx̃AD
dα
= − f
′(x̃F )
f ′′(x̃F )
− x̃F < 0.
In the case where the market price of domestic emission allowances is ex-
ogenous, i.e. unaffected by the abatement choice of the firm under consid-
eration, the firm’s domestic abatement remains unaffected by changes in
the allowability parameter α, while its abroad abatement and the amount
of allowances sold decreases (the amount of allowances bought increases).
Intuitively, these effects can be explained by the following reasoning. Sup-
pose in equilibrium the firm uses a mix of all three abatement options. An
increase in the allowability parameter, α, then triggers similar effects as
in Section 3.2. First, compared to the old equilibrium, abroad abatement
becomes more expensive compared to the other options, and, second, a
larger amount of abatement is needed to fulfill the obligation xmin.
If the firm is a selling firm, starting in an equilibrium in which it used
both domestic and abroad abatement and sold over-produced abatement
on the secondary market, a decrease in α reduces abroad abatement. As
a direct consequence, the quantity sold, xAS, is reduced. The firm reduces
the quantity sold to provide the additional units needed to fulfill xmin as
the marginal sales benefits foregone are smaller than the abatement costs
for one additional unit of domestic or abroad abatement would be. This is
the case, as the cost functions h(·) and f(·) are strictly convex while the
market price p is fixed.
Also, if the firm is a buying firm starting in an equilibrium in which it used
all three abatement options (domestic and abroad abatement and buying
on the secondary market), a decrease in α reduces abroad abatement. The
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firm uses the cheapest option to compensate for the abatement loss. The
cheapest option is to increase the amount of abatement bought, as the
market price p is fixed, while abatement costs at home and abroad follow
a convex increase.
Domestic abatement is unaffected by the allowability reduction both if
the firm is an efficient, selling firm and if the firm is an inefficient buying
firm. Hence, domestic abatement remains unchanged, abroad abatement
decreases and an efficient firm decrease its supply while an inefficient firm
increases its demand.
These results are contrary to those in Section 3.2. In Section 3.2, the anal-
ysis without a fixed price option of selling/buying allowances, I find that
domestic abatement always increases and abroad abatement might either
increase or decrease. This was due to the fact that a decrease in α gener-
ated the need for more abatement and this need had to be fulfilled using the
two options at hand, domestic and abroad abatement. However, as soon
as a third option exists, this third option is chosen whenever it is cheaper
than the other two. Reducing fixed price supply or increasing fixed price
demand is always cheaper than abating at increasing marginal abatement
costs. However, once the price for bought allowances is endogenous, the
analysis and the resulting effects change substantially, as will be shown in
the next subsection.
3.3.2. Endogenous Price
Now suppose there are two firms i and j that have asymmetric abatement
obligations xmini ≥ xminj but face the same abatement cost functions h (·)
and f (·) at home and abroad.50 Furthermore, the firms engage in bilateral
trade of emission certificates and the price for traded certificates is a result
of this bilateral interaction.
Proposition 3.4.
Consider two firms i and j with abatement obligations xmini ≥ xminj . With
50One can think of two firms that face similar abatement opportunities and receive the
same amount of initial allowances prior to my analysis, but differ in the emission
intensity of their final good production process. That is, they differ in the amount
of emissions they need to offset and therefore face different abatement obligations.
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an endogenous price for traded certificates, firms i and j abate x̃i = x̃j =
(xmini +xminj )/2 ∀α ∈ (0, 1]. Furthermore, i buys
(
(xmini +xminj )/2
)
−xminj certifi-
cates from j.51
Proof.
Let p be the equilibrium price from equation (3.8). For p and ∀α ∈ (0, 1],
p = h ′ (x̃Hi) = (1/α) f ′ (x̃Fi) and p = h ′
(
x̃Hj
)
= (1/α) f ′
(
x̃Fj
)
have to hold
in equilibrium.
That is, h ′ (x̃Hi) = (1/α) f ′ (x̃Fi) = h ′
(
x̃Hj
)
= (1/α) f ′
(
x̃Fj
)
.
Therefore, x̃Hi = x̃Hj and x̃Fi = x̃Fj must hold as well.52
By definition, overall abatement must be xmini + xminj . As x̃i = x̃j, i and j
share the overall abatement,
x̃i = x̃j =
xmini + xminj
2 .
Therefore, as xmini ≥ xminj , j sells
x̃ASj =
xmini + xminj
2 − x
min
j = x̃ADi
units of abatement to i.
For two firms i and j that differ only in their abatement obligation, xmini ≥
xminj , but are completely symmetric with respect to their abatement cost
functions h (·) at home and f (·) abroad, optimal outputs must be the same
if trade is possible between the two. Intuitively, if i abated more than j, the
marginal abatement costs would not be equalized between the two. Rather,
i would have larger marginal abatement costs than j. Reducing its abate-
ment by one unit would generate more cost savings for i than increasing its
abatement by one unit would generate in additional costs for j. Hence, they
equalize their marginal costs by equalizing their abatement and j sells its
overproduction to i, who needs it to comply with its abatement obligation.
51Equilibrium choices are marked with tildes.
52Recall that i and j have identical cost functions h(·) for domestic and f(·) for abroad
abatement and that the asymmetry is introduced via xmini ≥ xminj .
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Corollary 3.1.
With an endogenous price for traded certificates, the effects of a reduction
in α are exactly as in Propositions 3.1 and 3.2.
Proof.
From Proposition 3.4 follows that the amount sold
x̃ASj =
xmini + xminj
2 − x
min
j
is independent of α (dx̃ASj/dα = 0). That is, the effect of a reduction in
α can only be allotted to firm i′s individual decision to invest in xHi and
xFi . As the decrease in α as well as the abatement obligation xmini is the
same as without trade, the effects on x̃Hi and x̃Fi are analogous to the ones
without trade, as well. The same holds true for firm j. From here on, see
the proof of Propositions 3.1 and 3.2.
If two firms bilaterally trade certificates on a secondary market, the amount
of emission certificates that is traded is unaffected by changes in α. This
is due to the fact that the amount traded is half the difference between
the high and low abatement obligation and this difference is independent
of changes in allowability α due to the exogeneity of the abatement obli-
gations. Consequently, the increased need for abatement resulting from
the fact that abroad equilibrium abatement now counts less to the abate-
ment obligation than before has to be fully dealt with by the individual
firm. That is, as in the analysis without trade, the firm only has two
options to meet the increased need for abatement: domestic and abroad
abatement. An allowability reduction increases domestic abatement. At
the same time, foreign abatement can increase (decrease) as a result of a
decrease in allowability α if the value of domestic equilibrium abatement
relative to abroad equilibrium abatement is smaller than (larger than) the
abatement elasticity of marginal domestic abatement costs.
As the firm’s problem is analogous to the one without trade, condition
(3.7) applies again. That is, abatement abroad increases, reacting to an
allowability reduction, when in equilibrium the policy advantage at home
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weighted with domestic relative to abroad abatement is smaller than the
abatement elasticity of marginal domestic abatement costs.
While the amount of traded emission certificates remains unchanged, the
price for the intramarginal certificate increases with an allowability reduc-
tion. As marginal abatement costs over all abatement options have to be
equalized in equilibrium and marginal abatement costs at home and abroad
increase with a decrease in α, the same has to hold for p.
The fact that traded emissions remain unchanged despite the price increase
is due to the symmetry of firms i and j with respect to the abatement cost
functions. This symmetry implies that the supply and demand curves for
traded certificates have the same elasticities. As, in addition to that, the
change in α affects both firms in the same way, the supply curve shifts
upwards in the same way that the demand curve shifts upwards. That is,
the price increases, but the amount of traded emission credits remains the
same.
This would change if firms i and j were asymmetric with respect to their
abatement cost functions and supply and demand curves had different elas-
ticities. With a decrease in α, the amount traded would then increase if
supply was more elastic than demand and would decrease if supply was
less elastic than demand. The intuition is that the amount traded would
increase if the seller’s reaction were more elastic to the price effect, but
would decrease if the buyer’s reaction were more elastic to the price effect.
In contrast to the case with an exogenous price, however, dx̃H/dα will never
be zero, but will always be negative. Furthermore, while the condition
for dx̃F/dα < 0 would be stricter if the firms had asymmetric elasticities of
supply and demand, an increase of foreign abatement following from the
allowability reduction can never be ruled out entirely. The reason for this
is that the supply of emission certificates can never be perfectly elastic in
the two firm case as abatement cost functions are convex by assumption.53
53To offer perfectly elastic supply, selling firm j would need constant marginal abatement
costs (where marginal abatement costs are larger than average abatement costs) for
the domestic and abroad abatement that makes up its supply. However, firm j
has, by assumption, convex abatement costs for domestic and abroad abatement.
Therefore, its supply of emission certificates will never be perfectly elastic.
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3.4. Conclusion
This chapter considers a firm’s decision to abate at home and abroad in
a classical economic framework, i.e., cost minimization under a minimum
output constraint. In this framework, decreasing the allowability of abroad
emission certificates induces an increase of domestic abatement, but the
effect on abroad abatement is ambiguous. I show that abroad abatement
can also increase, when the policy advantage at home weighted with domes-
tic relative to abroad abatement is smaller than the abatement elasticity
of marginal domestic abatement costs. These findings are robust to the
introduction of a secondary market for certificates as long as the price for
certificates reacts to the change in allowability.
With respect to the policy goal associated with an allowability reduction,
the objective of providing a counter measure against non-additionality - by
breaking the pure offset character of the CDM and generating real emission
reductions - seems to be met. The results in this chapter imply that emis-
sions of affected firms (weakly) decrease due to the allowability reduction
for CERs. Emissions decrease if firms used abroad abatement before the
policy change and continue to use it afterward, and emissions would re-
main unchanged in the extreme case in which abroad abatement was fully
substituted for by domestic abatement.
My results, however, do not only suggest that overall abatement increases,
but also that a part of this increase can happen abroad. If abroad abate-
ment increases, an implication of this increase could be the reinforcement
of the crowding out of low-hanging fruits in the developing world.
Likewise, reducing the allowability of abroad abatement might fail to reduce
the monitoring problem regarding abroad abatement considered in Chapter
2 if abroad abatement does not react with a decrease, but with an increase.
Consequently, a quota on abroad abatement, as considered in Chapter 2,
may be (weakly) superior to an allowability or discount rate whenever
policy-makers care about the crowding-out of (future) abatement efforts of
the developing countries or care to reduce the monitoring problem regarding
abroad abatement. The reason for this is that with a quota the quantity
effect is omitted. Admittedly for every allowability reduction, there should
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exist a corresponding reduction in the total abatement obligation such that
the combined policy (allowability reduction plus reduction in abatement
obligation) leads to an equivalent outcome as a given quota. However,
politicians never considered decreasing the abatement obligation along with
the allowability of abroad abatement. That is, opposing effects on the
abatement allocation resulting from discount or allowability rate and quota
can not be ruled out.
While I show that the possibility for the increase of abroad abatement ex-
ists, it is up to further research to provide deeper insights into the condition
under which we see an increase of abroad abatement. A means to gener-
ate these insights could be the empirical estimation of the domestic policy
advantage and the elasticity of marginal domestic abatement costs, which
determine the condition for an increase of CDM abatement.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
Legal Framework on the Clean Development Mechanism
Articles 3 and 12 of the Kyoto Protocol54
54UNFCCC (1997)
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Modalities and Procedures for a Clean Development Mechansim55
55UNFCCC (2005)
71
Appendix to Chapter 1
72
Appendix to Chapter 1
73
Appendix to Chapter 1
74
Appendix to Chapter 1
75
Appendix to Chapter 1
76
Appendix B.
Appendix to Chapter 2
Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.2.
Proof.
a) For a compliant firm, see proof of Lemma 2.1.
b) Suppose that the firm is non-compliant and chooses (x′H , x′F ) such that
x′H + x′F < xmin.
If (x′H , x′F ) = (x
min/2, 0) then the firm’s expected costs are
E
[
C
(
xmin
2 , 0
)]
= c
(
xmin
2
)
+ µ
(
S + c
(
xmin
2
))
. (B.1)
In (B.1), the firm has a cost of domestic abatement equal to c (xmin/2).
Moreover, with probability µ it is monitored and has to pay fine S plus
the cost of the required ex post abatement. Given x′H = x
min/2 the cost-
minimizing ex post abatement choice is (x′′H , x′′F ) = (0, x
min/2), which yields
additional costs of c (xmin/2).
Suppose first that x′F ≥ x
min/2. Since the firm is non-compliant, this implies
that x′H < x
min/2. Thus, the firm is monitored with probability one and its
cost is
C (x′H , x′F ) = c (x′F ) + S + c
(
xmin − x′F
)
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where (x′′H , x′′F ) = (xmin − x′F − x′H , 0) is the ex post cost-minimizing abate-
ment choice (Since x′F is already larger than x
min/2, there will be no further
abroad abatement.). With
c (x′F )+S+c
(
xmin − x′F
)
> c
(
xmin
2
)
+S+c
(
xmin
2
)
> E
[
C
(
xmin
2 , 0
)]
,
the firm is strictly better off when choosing (x′H , x′F ) = (x
min/2, 0) than when
choosing x′F ≥ x
min/2 (and x′H < xmin − x′F ).
Now suppose that x′F < x
min/2.
If the firm chooses x′H > x
min/2, it is monitored with probability one.
Since the ex post cost-minimizing abatement choice is
(x′′H , x′′F ) = (0, xmin − x′H − x′F ), its cost is
C (x′H , x′F ) = c (x′H) + c (x′F ) + S +
(
c
(
xmin − x′H
)
− c (x′F )
)
> c
(
xmin
2
)
+ S + c
(
xmin
2
)
> E
[
C
(
xmin
2 , 0
)]
.
If the firm chooses instead x′H < x
min/2, its cost-minimizing ex post abate-
ment choice is (x′′H , x′′F ) = ((x
min/2)− x′H , (x
min/2)− x′F ) which yields a total
cost of
C (x′H , x′F ) = (x′H) + c (x′F ) + S +
(
c
(
xmin
2
)
− c (x′H)
)
+
(
c
(
xmin
2
)
− c (x′F )
)
= S + c
(
xmin
2
)
+ c
(
xmin
2
)
> E
[
C
(
xmin
2 , 0
)]
.
Finally, if x′H = x
min/2, the firm is monitored with probability µ only. The ex
post cost-minimizing abatement equals (x′′H , x′′F ) = (0, x
min/2). This yields
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an expected cost of
E
[
C
(
xmin
2 , x
′
F
)]
= c
(
xmin
2
)
+ c (x′F ) + µ
(
S + c
(
xmin
2
)
− c (x′F )
)
= c
(
xmin
2
)
+ (1− µ) c (x′F ) + µ
(
S + c
(
xmin
2
))
,
which is strictly higher than E [C (xmin/2, 0)] for all x′F > 0, µ < 1. Alto-
gether, this shows part b).
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Legal Framework on linking the EU ETS and the CDM
Linking Directive56
56EU (2004)
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Appendix to Chapter 3
Deriving substitution and quantity effects
Total differentiation of equations (3.1) yields
h ′′(x∗H)dx∗H =
1
α
f ′′ (x∗F ) dx∗F −
1
α2
f ′ (x∗F ) dα.
This is equivalent to
dx∗H =
1
α
f ′′ (x∗F )
h ′′(x∗H)
dx∗F −
1
α2
f ′ (x∗F )
h ′′(x∗H)
dα. (C.1)
Total differentiation of equation (3.2) yields
dxmin = dx∗H + x∗Fdα + αdx∗F . (C.2)
Plugging (C.1) into (C.2) gives:
dxmin =
[
1
α
f ′′ (x∗F )
h ′′(x∗H)
+ α
]
dx∗F +
[
x∗F −
1
α2
f ′ (x∗F )
h ′′(x∗H)
]
dα.
Solving for a change in abroad abatement yields
dx∗F =
[
h ′′(x∗H)
1
α
f ′′ (x∗F ) + αh ′′ (x∗H)
]
dxmin +
[ 1
α2
f ′ (x∗F )− h ′′ (x∗H)x∗F
1
α
f ′′ (x∗F ) + αh ′′ (x∗H)
]
dα.
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That is, as dxmin = 0, the overall effect of a change in allowability α on
abroad abatement is
dx∗F
dα
=
1
α2
f ′ (x∗F )− h ′′ (x∗H)x∗F
1
α
f ′′ (x∗F ) + αh ′′ (x∗H)
.
Compensating for the change in α, that is, taking dxmin = x∗Fdα, yields
the isolated substitution effect:
dx∗F =
[
h ′′(xH)x∗F
1
α
f ′′ (x∗F ) + αh ′′ (x∗H)
]
dα +
[ 1
α2
f ′ (x∗F )− h ′′ (x∗H)x∗F
1
α
f ′′ (x∗F ) + αh ′′ (x∗H)
]
dα.
The substitution effect abroad is therefore
SEF =
1
α2
f ′ (x∗F )
1
α
f ′′ (x∗F ) + αh ′′ (x∗H)
.
Consequently, the quantity effect QEF = dx∗F/dα− SEF is
QEF = −
h ′′ (x∗H)x∗F
1
α
f ′′ (x∗F ) + αh ′′ (x∗H)
.
Likewise, for changes in domestic abatement:
dx∗H =
1
α
f ′′(x∗F )
1
α
f ′′ (x∗F ) + αh ′′ (x∗H)
dxmin−
[ 1
α
x∗Ff
′′ (x∗F ) + 1αf
′ (x∗F )
1
α
f ′′ (x∗F ) + αh ′′ (x∗H)
]
dα. (C.3)
That is, the overall effect of a change in allowability α on domestic abate-
ment is
dx∗H
dα
= −
1
α
x∗Ff
′′ (x∗F ) + 1αf
′ (x∗F )
1
α
f ′′ (x∗F ) + αh ′′ (x∗H)
,
while the substitution and quantity effects are
SEH = −
1
α
f ′ (x∗F )
1
α
f ′′ (x∗F ) + αh ′′ (x∗H)
and
QEH = −
1
α
f ′′ (x∗F )x∗F
1
α
f ′′ (x∗F ) + αh ′′ (x∗H)
.
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